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"Offsets" is the umbrella term for a broad range of industrial and commercial 
"compensatory" practices. Specifically, offset agreements in the defense environment are 
increasing globally as a percentage of exports. Developed countries with established 
defense industries use offsets to channel work or technology to their domestic defense 
companies. Countries with newly industrialized economies are utilizing both military and 
commercial related offsets that involve the transfer of technology and know-how. 
Overall, offsets are definitely not new, and occur under a variety of names.  In the 
defense industry it is now an accepted practice among both sellers and purchasers, and is 
likely to remain so for the indefinite future. This research will discuss defense offsets 
within the context of international trade and global arms trade. This discussion will draw 
upon the existing body of theory and practice on offsets (as identified in the literature 
review) to provide a basic understanding of offsets within the wider international trade 
context. The offset policies of selected countries will be analyzed prior to exploring the 
development of Turkish offset policy. Additionally sample defense acquisition programs 
will be examined as case studies to explain the incentives within Turkish offsets and to 
suggest future offset policies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to enhance understanding of offsets in the context of 
defense related international trade, offsets in major Turkish weapon system acquisitions 
and Turkey’s current policy on offsets. In particular, the offset literature will be discussed 
in the wider context of international and reciprocal trade. After first reviewing and 
discussing the offset literature, this study will examine the offset policies of selected 
countries to provide useful background information. Additionally, the development of the 
Turkish offset policy in historical context and the current policies will be explored. 
Finally, selected Turkish programs with offsets will be analyzed, with a view to 
understanding incentives involved, as well as the experience gained by Turkey in those 
cases. Finally, the study will offer a view of the nature of Turkish offsets policies in the 
future.  
B. BACKGROUND 
"Offsets" is the umbrella term for a broad range of industrial and commercial 
"compensatory" practices. Specifically, offset agreements appear to be common in large 
defense sales, such as of aircraft, radars, and other electronic systems, and are increasing 
as a percentage of worldwide exports. Basically, a buyers’ market (with increasing 
competition among suppliers in a reduced global defense market with declining military 
budgets) has increased the frequency and size of offset agreements. Developed countries 
with established defense industries use offsets to channel work or technology to their 
domestic defense companies. Countries with newly industrialized economies utilize both 
military and commercial offsets that involve transfer of technology and know-how. 
Policymakers in the buying nations can use the offset agreements to address a variety of 
domestic economic and political issues. The desired effects are generally identified as: 
labor market corrections, promotion of capital investment, support for strategic 
industries, adjustments for asymmetric information, reduction of risk and uncertainty, 
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alternative sources of financing, and political support for defense purchases. Overall, 
offsets continue to be an important and necessary factor in defense contracts.  
Most significantly, Turkey was involved in offsets intended to minimize deficits 
in the balance of payments with the contract for co-production of F-16 aircraft locally in 
1984. With the establishment of the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (UDI) in 
1985 – better known by its Turkish acronym of SSM, the new organization also became 
responsible for the export of defense industrial products and for the coordination of 
offsets. A meeting held in March 1990 at the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign 
Trade (UTFT), resulted in the creation of an ‘Offset Commission’ under the coordination 
of SSM to determine Turkish offset policy. Another result of the meeting was preparation 
of the first ‘SSM Offset Guidelines,’ in July 1991. The guideline has been amended two 
times (in 2003 and 2007). As of 31st December 2007, the number of contracts signed by 
SSM totaled 77, with U.S.$6.94 Billion committed. To date, 22 of the offset contracts 
awarded by SSM have been successfully completed. The remaining 55 are still in effect 
and continue to be executed. 
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research is to provide an extensive review of offsets in the 
international defense marketplace, particularly with respect to their effects on Turkey. 
Offset literature will be discussed within the wider system of global defense trade. This 
study will also examine the offset policies of selected countries. Additionally, the 
development of the Turkish offset policy in historical context and the current policies will 
be explored. Selected Turkish programs with offsets will be analyzed, with a view to 
understanding incentives involved, as well as the experience gained by Turkey in those 
cases to provide a well-informed prediction of future directions in Turkish offset policies. 
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What is Turkish offset policy – its current state and preferred direction of future 
development? 
Secondary Research Questions 
• Identify the offsets and their international use. 
• Identify the offset policies of selected countries. 
• Identify the history and development of offsets in Turkey and current 
offset policy. 
• Analyze selected offset projects of Turkey. 
• Discuss alternate future offset policies in Turkey 
E. SCOPE 
This research will discuss offsets within the context of international trade and 
global arms trade. This discussion will use the existing body of theory and practice on 
offsets (as identified in the literature review) to provide a basic understanding of offsets 
within the wider reciprocal trade context. The offset policies of selected countries will be 
analyzed prior to explore the development of Turkish offset policy. Additionally sample 
defense acquisition programs will be examined as case studies to explain the incentives 
posed and future trends. The study will use publicly available data.  
Offsets may be used for commercial practices. However, this study will be limited 
to those occurring as a result defense procurements. Countries have various motives for 
demanding and providing offsets. This research will address these incentives, but not in 
detail. The scope of the study will be limited to review and discussion of the offset 
literature, combined with policies and cases to derive general conclusions and 




using offset practices on macroeconomies (employment, balance of payments, …) 
defense industrial base, defense preparedness, competitive advantage, arms proliferation 
or national security. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology of this research will be limited to literature review related to 
offsets and international trade as well as a review of offset related documents produced 
by Turkey, other subject countries and international organizations such as World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Turkish Government documents include the unofficial translation 
of the offset guidelines issued and revised over a period of time.  
Selected major weapon system projects of Turkey will be basis for case analysis 
to enhance the understanding of Turkish offset policy. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II essays an empirical overview of offsets within international trade, 
including the arms trade. Since offsets are closely tied trade policy, international trade 
theory and policies are introduced. Reciprocal trade agreements are introduced as the 
international trade system practices to establish a framework for understanding the offsets 
related to arms trade. Before discussing offsets in detail, the main characteristics of the 
arms trade and the recent developments in arms trade environment are outlined. Finally, 
the terms and conditions, reasons and arguments for offsets are discussed. With the 
background provided, the distinction of the defense offsets within the wider context of 
the reciprocal trade is warranted. 
Chapter III reviews the offset policies and their implementation in selected 
countries. Every country has different objectives to pursue (e.g., emphasis on improving 
industrial base or technology transfer) and these objectives may change over time — 
depending in part on the experience from previous offsets. Studying and understanding 
other countries’ rationale for offsets, as well as their policies and methods for 
implementation provides useful information for developing offset policies for countries 
like Turkey 
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Chapter IV starts with overview of the Turkish defense industry and summarizes 
the history of Turkish offset applications in context of established organizations, 
published documents and policies of Turkey. Besides the presentation of development of 
Turkish offset policy, the evaluation of the official offset regulations published by SSM is 
warranted. Finally, the present and future outlook of Turkish offset applications will be 
discussed. 
Chapter V is based on case analysis of selected major weapon procurement 
projects (out of 22 completed, 55 ongoing projects involving offsets) in order to enhance 
the understanding of Turkish offset policy. Key facts, benefits and experiences gained 
will be emphasized in each case analysis. Basically, F-16, A400M and JSF projects are 
studied in the context of reflecting past, present and future approaches towards defense 
industry and offset policies. 
Chapter VI provides a summary and conclusions regarding Turkish offset policy; 
its current state and preferred direction of future development. To that end, this chapter 
addresses an overall summary of the offset literature and their international use, offset 
policies of selected countries when appropriate, history and development of Turkish 
offset policy and analysis of the selected Turkish major weapon system acquisitions, in 
light of the information presented from Chapter II through IV. The summary concludes 
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II. REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF OFFSET LITERATURE 
A. OVERVIEW 
"Offsets" applies to a broad range of industrial and commercial "compensatory" 
practices required of foreign suppliers as a condition of purchase in either government-to-
government sales, or commercial sales under foreign public agency procurement 
programs.(Pompiliu, undated) This report will delineate Turkish offset methods. 
Therefore, we will limit our discussion to offsets occurring as part of defense-related 
acquisitions. However, offset regulations have complicated structures – affecting and 
influenced by various stakeholders. To provide a better understanding of offsets, 
international trade structure including basic definitions, free trade principles and 
reciprocal trade agreements; and major characteristics of international defense 
marketplace are introduced. 
B. INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Trade can be basically defined as the exchange of goods, services, or both 
(commerce). While the primitive method for trade was barter, money is used in today’s 
world as a medium to facilitate exchange. The institution that allows trade is called a 
market, which, to some degree, drives the trading parties to formulate specific trade 
policies. It is essential to understand the principles of trade as much as possible for people 
who have concerns about trade related issues, such as offsets. Trade that takes place 
between the nations is called international trade. There are many reasons for the existence 
of international trade.  
1. Reasons for International Trade 
Economists Lieberman and Hall define the comparative advantage and 
opportunity cost, specialization and exchange as a basis for the logic of international 
trade theory. 
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a. Opportunity Cost and Comparative Advantage 
Opportunity cost refers to what is given up when taking an action or 
making a choice. All economic decisions made by individuals or society are costly. The 
correct way to measure the cost of a choice is its opportunity cost — that which is given 
up to make the choice (Lieberman and Hall, 2005, p. 28). 
Comparative advantage refers to the ability to produce a good or service at 
a lower opportunity cost than other producers. Mutually beneficial trade between any two 
countries is possible whenever one country is relatively better at producing a good than 
the other country is. Being relatively better means having the ability to produce a good at 
a lower opportunity cost-that is, at a lower sacrifice of other goods foregone (Lieberman 
and Hall, 2005, p. 566). 
The reasons for the existence of comparative advantage and accordingly 
international trade can be diverse. According to Professor Suranovic (2003) there are five 
basic reasons why trade may take place between the nations. They are that international 
trade occurs as a result of differences in technology, differences in resource endowments, 
differences in demand, existence of scale in production, existence of government policies. 
Technology refers to the techniques used to turn resources (labor, capital, 
land) into outputs while resource endowments are the skills and abilities of a country's 
workforce, the natural resources available within its borders (minerals, farmland, etc.), 
and the sophistication of its capital stock (machinery, infrastructure, communications 
systems). (Suranovic, 2003) It is obvious that all the countries do not have the same level 
of technology and resources. These differences may create advantageous trade of either 
resources or end items between the countries. On the other hand, overall demand 
differences deriving from the diverse requirements of different nations, cost advantages 
as a result of “increasing returns to scale” and government tax/subsidiary programs can 
be sufficient to generate comparative advantage and trade between the nations.1 Each of 
                                                 
1 For more discussion of these issues see International Economics Study Center web site: 
http://internationalecon.com/Trade/Tch30/T30-0.php. (Accessed September 2008). 
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these issues, especially the technology and resource endowments are the basis to explain 
why comparative advantage emerges in the production of goods and services. 
Comparative advantage is certainly related to the capital and resources 
each nation has at its disposal. However, it is not easy to explain why each specific case 
of comparative advantage arose in the first place. Countries often develop strong 
comparative advantages in the goods they have produced in the past, regardless of why 
they began producing those goods (Lieberman and Hall, 2005, p. 577, emphasis in 
original). 
b. Specialization and Exchange 
Specialization refers to the method of production in which each person 
concentrates on a limited number of activities. Specialization and exchange enables us to 
enjoy greater production and higher living standards than would otherwise be possible. 
As a result, all modern economies exhibit high degrees of specialization and exchange.  
2. International Trade Structure 
a. Market Structures 
Market is a social institution that facilitates trade. Market structure is a 
term that encompasses all the characteristics of a market that influence the behavior of 
buyers and sellers when they come together to trade (Lieberman and Hall, 2005, p. 197). 
The four basic types of market structures are perfect competition, monopoly, 
monopolistic competition and oligopoly. 
Perfect competition exists when there are many buyers and sellers, the 
product is standardized, and sellers can (relatively) easily enter or exit the market. The 
number of buyers and sellers is so large that no individual decision maker can 
significantly affect the price of the product by changing the quantity it buys or sells 
(Lieberman and Hall, 2005, p. 198.)  
Monopoly involves only one seller (and many buyers) for a product with 
no close substitutes. The continued existence of a monopoly can be explained by barriers 
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to other firms entering the market such as economies of scale, legal barriers, and network 
externalities. The monopolistic firm sets the market price. 
Most markets are neither monopolistic nor purely competitive. They lie 
somewhere between two: imperfect competition. We can classify monopolistic 
competition and oligopoly as types of imperfect competition. In monopolistic 
competition, there are many firms selling products that are differentiated, yet are still 
close substitutes, and in which there is free entry and exit (Lieberman and Hall, 2005, p. 
248). 
Oligopoly refers to the market structure in which only a few large firms 
dominate the market. A small number of strategically interdependent firms produce the 
dominant share of output in the market (Lieberman and Hall, 2005, p. 198). Reputation as 
a barrier, strategic barriers and legal barriers are among the reasons oligopolies develop 
and continue.2 
b. Government Policies and Tools on International Trade 
Governments interfere in international trade to pursue national interests. 
The extent and the method of intervention are therefore determined by national policies. 
 
 
Figure 1.   International Trade Policies (From Suranovic, 2003, p. 5-4) 
                                                 
2 Monopsonic and oligopsonic market structures also relate to imperfect competition. In monopsonic 
competition, there are several sellers and only one buyer. Several buyers and a group of buyers exist in the 
oligopsonic market structure. Defense industries tend to have a monopsonic nature. 
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Two extreme states could potentially be created by national government 
policies. At one extreme, a government could pursue a "laissez faire" policy with respect 
to trade and thus impose no regulation whatsoever that would impede (or encourage) the 
free voluntary exchange of goods between nations. We define this condition as free trade 
Suranovic, 2003). The other extreme points the autarky that government eliminates all 
incentives for international trade, and may actually forbid such trade.  
A pure state of free trade or autarky has never existed in the real world. 
All nations impose some form of trade-limiting policies. And probably no government 
has ever had such complete control over economic activity as to eliminate cross-border 
trade entirely (Suranovic, 2003).  
Transition to free trade involves government policies to promote free 
trade, and can be classified as “trade liberalization.” At the same time, protectionist 
movements toward autarky will end up with isolation (as an extreme case). 
Imports and exports are the basic flows of international trade. Imports 
refer to the goods or services those produced abroad, but consumed domestically. On the 
other hand, exports refer to the goods or services those produced domestically, but sold 
abroad. Governments interfere with free international trade by resorting to restrictive 
measures intended to achieve national objectives. These measures are chiefly (1) tariffs, 
which impose a tax or customs duty on merchandise crossing the boundaries of the 
nation, and (2) quantitative restrictions, which, by means of quotas or exchange control or 
a combination of both, limit the physical quantities or value of the goods that may be 
exported or imported (Kramer, d’Arlin and Root, 1959, p. 198). 
c. International Trade Agreements 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the institutional body dealing 
with the rules of trade between member nations, on a nearly global scope. The main 
emphasis is on avoiding trade barriers between countries and promoting free trade. 
Essentially, the WTO is a place where member governments go, to sort out the trade 
problems they face with each other (WTO, 2007, p. 9). The WTO was established in 
1995 and has 152 member countries as of June 2008. Before this date, there was not an 
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organization dealing with international trade regulations; General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) which is a set of rules agreed upon by nations was the norm from 
1948 to 1995. The starting point of GATT was efforts to structure the international 
economy after World War II. WTO was established on the basis of GATT rules and it has 
taken the functions of GATT as an international organization dealing with trade issues on 
multilateral and plurilateral basis. 
WTO describes the term multilateral framework involving most major 
trading nations. Plurilateral agreements, on the other hand, are negotiated by member 
countries on a voluntary basis. The plurilateral agreements in GATT were amended in the 
negotiations and turned into multilateral commitments accepted by all WTO members 
(WTO, 2007, p. 17). Currently, Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and 
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (TCA) are the only two remaining plurilateral 
agreements. 
Regional trade agreements (RTA) are another concern within the context 
of international trade agreements. According to the WTO, regionalism is described in the 
Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms, as “actions by governments to liberalize or facilitate 
trade on a regional basis, sometimes through free-trade areas or customs unions”. North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), European Union (EU), ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA) are some of the main RTAs (among the 380 reported to WTO as of July 
2007). According to WTO, RTAs can complement the multilateral trading system 
(MTS); however, the discriminatory structure of RTAs may create risks for the 
multilateral framework.3 
Turkey has been a WTO member since 1995 and has observer status on 
GPA within WTO. At the same time, Turkey is party to various bilateral and regional 
Trade agreements.4 
                                                 
3 For a detailed definition and discussion of these of these issues see Regional Trade Agreements on 
WTO web site: http://www.wto.org (Accessed 3 September 2008). 
4 See  Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements of Turkey on WTO web site: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm#analysis_publications  (Accessed 3 September 
2008). 
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3. Principles of Free Trade 
According to WTO, there are five main principles on the foundation of MTS:  
a. Without Discrimination 
Under the WTO agreements, countries cannot normally discriminate 
between their trading partners. Granting someone a special favor (such as a lower 
customs duty rate for one of their products) entails an obligation to do the same for all 
other WTO members. This principle is known as most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment. 
Imported and locally produced goods should be treated equally — at least after the 
foreign goods have entered the market (WTO, 2007, p. 10). 
b. Freer Trade 
Lowering trade barriers is one of the most obvious means of encouraging 
trade. The barriers concerned include customs duties (or tariffs) and measures such as 
import bans or quotas that restrict quantities selectively. From time to time, other issues 
such as red tape and exchange rate policies have also been discussed (WTO, 2007, p. 11). 
However, freer trade is not always beneficial for everybody. Therefore, developing 
countries usually have exceptional statues in order to fulfill their obligations under the 
multilateral and plurilateral agreements. 
c. Predictable 
With stability and predictability, investment is encouraged, jobs are 
created and consumers can fully enjoy the benefits of competition — choice and lower 
prices. The multilateral trading system is an attempt by governments to make the business 
environment stable and predictable (WTO, 2007, p. 11). The binding commitment of 
each party is an attempt to provide predictability and stability for international trade. 
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d. Promoting Fair Competition 
WTO defines itself as a system of rules dedicated to open, fair and 
undistorted competition rather than a just a “free trade” institution. In this context, the 
system may allow tariffs and, in limited circumstances, other forms of protection.  
e. Encouraging Development and Economic Reform 
WTO, being an international negotiation forum in its nature, establishes 
the opportunity for development through economic reforms. However, developing 
countries and countries in transition to market economies need flexibility in order to 
implement the required regulations of free trade. 
4. Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Terminology has been a source of confusion in the field of offsets and 
countertrade (Schmidt, 1989, p. 4) Compensatory trade agreements — or reciprocal trade 
— are another aspect of the modern international trade structure. And, while the terms 
may be defined in different forms, they are usually used as complementary policy 
instruments. Countertrade and offset terms have usually been overall terms to define and 
classify reciprocal trade agreements. However, there is not a universally agreed definition 
of these terms to date. This is mainly due to the complex and dynamic nature of 
reciprocal trade. On the other hand, most of the literature in this field concludes 
reciprocal trade agreements in both commercial and defense markets have different 
motives and characteristics in nature. 
Author Grant T. Hammond classifies reciprocal trade as countertrade, offsets and 
barter — which involve all aspects of international political economy. They involve 
exchange of goods, services, technology, investments, money, people and knowledge of 
all kinds. Those involved are limited only by their own creativity in putting together these 
complicated deals. Everything from agricultural commodities and advertising to military 
equipment and strategic resources is involved in compensatory arrangements (Hammond, 
1990, p. 4). 
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First, countertrade refers to reciprocal and compensatory trade agreements 
involving the purchase of goods or services by the seller from the buyer of his product, or 
arrangements whereby the seller assists the buyer in reducing the amount of the net cost 
of the purchase through some form of compensatory financing. It generally refers to 
civilian, not military, arrangements. Second, offsets are compensatory, reciprocal trade 
agreements for industrial goods and services as a condition of military-related export 
sales and services. Some authors use “offset” as an umbrella term for overall reciprocal 
trade. However, the term is so ensconced in the aerospace/defense sector that Hammond 
treats it as a separate entity. Finally, barter is a one-time only exchange of goods or 
services of equivalent value specified in one contract, without the use of money. In 
addition to these broad categories, there are several other, more detailed terms — such as 
bilateral clearing, coproduction, counterpurchase, overseas investment, technology 
transfer, import compensation, switch trading and evidence accounts5-which may be 
subsumed under one or other of the three main classifications above (Hammond, 1990, p. 
7, emphasis in original). 
WTO approaches the countertrade with skepticism, because it generally distortss 
international markets. This skepticism is particularly valid in situations where the true 
value of the transactions is difficult (or impossible) to establish. Nonetheless, the arms 
trade is excluded from both multilateral and plurilateral agreements 
In essence, the terms reciprocal trade, countertrade and offsets are generally 
synonymous. However, meanings may differ on case basis. Theoretically, either 
“countertrade” or “offset” may be an umbrella term for reciprocal trade, but in practice 
                                                 
5 Bilateral clearing: These are essentially government-to-government trade agreements whose purpose 
is to achieve a balance in international trade accounts with each other. Coproduction: This is an agreement 
for a government or producer to acquire the technical information required to produce a certain product or 
component. These are generally government-to-government agreements or between a government and a 
private manufacturer. Counterpurchase: This is an agreement whereby the initial exporter buys or 
undertakes to find a buyer for a specific amount or value of unrelated goods from the initial importer during 
a specific time period. Overseas investment: A way for the purchasing party to increase investment, create 
jobs and stimulate the domestic economy even when making foreign purchases. Technology transfer: This 
refers to the transfer of technology mandated as part of a countertrade or offset agreement, other than 
coproduction or licensed production. Import compensation: This is an agreement whereby the initial 
exporter agrees to accept output in full or partial payment. Switch trading: This is a process whereby one 
party to a countertrade agreement sells discounted purchase options to the goods or services for which  he 
originally contracted to a third party who must then complete the obligation. Evidence accounts: These 
arrangements involve the sales and purchases from an agreed-upon list. (Hammond, 1990, p. 10). 
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offsets are the norm in military reciprocal trade. This report will discuss offsets in more 
detail within this chapter. Considering that offsets occur more frequently in defense 
related, high technology products, we will define the characteristics of the defense 
industry and the current arms environment before addressing offsets in detail. 
C. THE INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRADE 
1. Defense Market Structure 
At its basic level, the arms trade concerns the acquisition and maintenance of 
national security by nation-states. In most cases, this security has been achieved primarily 
through development of military capability. This capability comes in the form of military 
equipment and support, and it can be either indigenously produced or imported from 
another supplier (a commercial firm or a country) via international trade. Through the 
years, a host of terms have been used to describe this international phenomenon: arms 
transfers, arms trade, military and/or security assistance, military cooperation, and so 
forth (Laurence, 1992, p. 3.)  
While the economic principles of international trade, such as comparative 
advantage, opportunity cost, specialization and exchange, are a useful starting point for 
an observer of international arms trade, there is a substantially different, more ambiguous 
and complex structure of products and players.  
The arms trade is something different from “normal” trade in other commodities 
because of their political significance, which arises from several factors. A first point is 
that arms – and arms transfers – are closely related to security, one of the most basic 
goals of states. A second reason is that arms transfers are often perceived as gestures of 
political support transcending the purely military utility. The political significance of 
arms transfers is further reinforced by their impacts on the global distribution of military 
capabilities (Catrina, 1988, p. 12).  
Table-1 presents some examples where defense marketplace characteristics differ 
from the standard assumptions of free market theory. The most significant difference is 
the degree of government involvement. Since military capability is the main determinant 
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of national security, government interference is the norm in all aspects of international 
arms trade. Threat assessment and national sovereignty concerns are the most important 
factors motivating government interference in arms trade. 
Free Market Theory Defense Market 
Many small buyers One buyer(DoD or Ministry of Defense) 
Many small suppliers Very few, large suppliers of a given item 
All items small, perfectly divisible and 
large in quantities 
One ship built every few years, for 
hundreds of millions of dollars each 
Market sets prices Monopoly or oligopoly pricing-or “buy 
in” to “available dollars” 
Free movement in and out of market Extensive barriers to entry and exit 
Prices set by marginal costs Prices proportional to total costs 
Prices set by marginal utility Any price paid for the desired military 
performance 
Prices fall with reduced demand Prices rise with reduced demand 
Supply adjust to demand Large excess capacity 
Labor highly mobile Great diminishing labor mobility 
Decreasing or constant returns to scale Increasing returns to scale in region of 
interest 
Market shifts rapidly to changes in supply 
and demand 
7-10 years to develop an new system, then 
3-5 years to produce it 
Market smoothly reaches equilibrium. Erratic behavior from year to year. 
General equilibrium-assumes prices will 
return to their equilibrium value. 
Costs have been rising at approximately 
5% per year (excluding inflation). 
Profits equalized across economy. Wide and consistent profit variations 
between sectors; even wider between 
firms. 
Perfect mobility of capital (money). Heavy dept, difficulty in borrowing. 
Mobility of capital (equipment) to 
changing demand. 
Large and old capital equipment “locks 
in” companies. 
No government involvement. Government is regulator, specifier, 
banker, judge of claims, etc. 
Selection based on price. Selection often based on politics, or sole 
source, or “negotiation”, only 8% of the 
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dollars awarded on price competition. 
No externalities. All businesses working for DoD must 
satisfy requirements of OSHA, EEO, 
awards to areas of high unemployment, 
small business set asides, etc. 
Prices fixed by market. Most businesses, with any risk, is for 
“cost plus fee”. 
All products of a given type are the same. Essentially, each producer’s products are 
different. 
Competition is for share of market. Competition is frequently for all or none 
of a given market. 
Production is for inventory. Production occurs after sale is made. 
Size of market established by the buyers 
and sellers. 
Size of market established by third party 
(Congress) through annual budget. 
Demand sensitive to price. Demand “threat”-sensitive, or responds to 
availability of new technology; almost 
never price sensitive. 
Equal technology throughout industry. Competitive technologies. 
Relatively stable, multiyear commitments. Annual commitments, with frequent 
changes. 
Benefits of the purchase go to the buyer. A “public good”. 
Buyer has the choice of spending now or 
saving for later purchase. 
DoD must spend its congressional 
authorization. 
Table 1.   Some Examples of “Market Imperfections and Failures” in Defense (From 
Gansler, 1980, p. 30) 
If some conditions for the traditional free market (the “first best”) do not apply 
and cannot be created, then creating some additional free market conditions or moving 
more in the direction of free market conditions may actually result in reduced efficiency 
in the allocation of resources. Since it is clear that in the case of defense industry some of 
the constraints to free-market operation cannot be removed, it follows that all policy 
actions in the defense sector must be made with the “theory of the second best” clearly in 
mind (Gansler, 1980, p. 29). 
“Theory of the second best” that Gansler describes might be highly subjective 
depending on the cyclical nature of the international defense industry. The ambiguous 
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nature of the threat assessment enforces the cyclical nature of the arms trade, while the 
dependence on international arms trade is perceived as “bad” and national sovereignty, 
regardless of economic realities, should somehow be protected.  
2. Arms Trade Environment 
Measuring the value and content of arms transfers is extremely difficult – even 
legal, conventional transactions. First, there are problems of secrecy. Although it is hard 
to conceal for the long transfer of major arms systems such as tanks or combat aircraft, 
the precise value of deals and exact quantity of equipment can be disguised. Second, 
there are definitional issues. It is not just a matter of deciding what sorts of military 
equipment should be included, in a spectrum of running from uniforms, through trucks, 
four-wheel drive vehicles, radios, reconnaissance aircraft and transport helicopters to 
rifles, fighter aircraft and missiles. There is also the issue of whether to include the value 
of training packages and other elements such as civil engineering and construction in 
arms deals (Taylor, 1994, p.  97.) Fortunately, the observer of the defense offsets can 
focus on trends rather than the exact numbers. 
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
Yearbook (2008), world military expenditure is estimated to have been $1339 billion in 
2007—a real-terms increase of 6 per cent over 2006 and of 45 per cent since 19986.  
                                                 
6 See SIPRI web site for the list of the items constituting the base for the military spending estimates. 
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Figure 2.   World Military Expenditure, 1988-2007 (From SIPRI Yearbook 2008)7 
Figure-4 shows the total military expenditure in the world from 1988 to 2007. 
Another report that Congressional Research Service (CRS) published at 2007 states that 
during the period of 1999-2006, conventional arms transfer agreements (which represent 
orders for future delivery) to developing nations comprised 66.4% of the value of all 
international arms transfer agreements worldwide. The portion of agreements with 
developing countries constituted 65.7% of all agreements globally from 2003-2006. 
Statistics on world military spending may vary, among  available sources, depending on 
the data obtained by the researchers. Latest trends on military spending, and arms trade, 
can be interpreted based on two major facts: the revolution on military affairs (RMA) and 
globalization. 
a. Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 
Based upon an assessment of the outcomes of what have been defined as 
RMAs in the past, a revolution in military affairs occurred when one of the participants in 
                                                 
7 Some countries are excluded because of lack of data or consistent time series data. World totals 
exclude Angola, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Myanmar, North Korea, Qatar, Somalia, Trinidad 
and Tobago and Viet Nam. 
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a military competition incorporates new technology, organization, and doctrine to the 
extent that victory is attained in the immediate instance, but more importantly, that any 
other actors who might wish to deal with that participant or that activity must match, or 
counter the new combination of technology, organization, and doctrine in order to 
prevail. The accomplishments of the victor become the necessary foundation for any 
future military activities in that area of conflict (Galdi, 1995). 
Contemporary military affairs illustrate rapid changes in both military 
technology and the art of war. That is, new technologies and methods are not merely 
changing wars, but changing the ways wars are fought. The ongoing Revolutions in 
Military Affairs (RMAs) have both created new military competencies for successful 
innovators and decreased significantly the operational effectiveness of previous methods 
(Franck, Lewis and Udis, 2008, p. 4). RMAs change the requirements of the armed forces 
leading to reforms in acquisition policies of the governments and also changes in the 
defense industry. However this is likely to happen in the long run. 
Information-age warfare is the term describing the major points of the 
nearly global RMAs especially after the end of Cold War. Some of the major points of 
this RMA are summarized below8: 
• Improvements in computers and electronics making possible major 
advances in weapons and warfare, such as the networking of 
information, communications, platforms, weapons, warriors, and 
more, to permit greater speed of decision-making 
• Radically more capable sensors, making the battlefield 
“transparent” 
• Platforms—whether land, sea, or air—becoming lighter, more fuel 
efficient, faster, and stealthier, and capable of very rapid 
deployment and enormous lethality 
                                                 
8 See “Recent Trends in Thinking About Warfare” on http://www.cna.org/documents/d0014875.a1.pdf  
for more discussion of these issues (By Albert A. Nofi, Accessed 8 September 2008). 
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• Technologically different types of weaponry becoming available, 
such as space-based systems, directed energy weapons, and 
advanced biochemical agents. 
Changes in methods of warfare have, not surprisingly, implications for 
defense industries (Franck, Lewis and Udis, 2008, p. 12). Increasing complexity of the 
military hardware has created new players in the global defense industry. More 
companies, whether main or subcontractors, are likely to take role in defense contracts. 
Combined with the effects of globalization, this makes arms trade more competitive and 
important for the firms. 
b. Globalization 
“Globalization” is perhaps the most popular term used to describe changes 
in the international environment since the end of the Cold War (Guay, 2007, p. 1). 
International Money Fund defines the globalization as the growing economic 
interdependence of countries worldwide through the increasing volume and variety of 
cross-border transactions in goods and services and of international capital flows, and 
also through the more rapid and widespread diffusion of technology. 
The global arms trade is not governed by WTO rules, since a country 
cannot be prevented from taking actions that it considers necessary for the protection of 
its essential security interests. But the same forces of globalization that have facilitated 
the trade of commercial goods and services — multinational supply chains, complex 
transportation logistics, penetration of new markets, and innovative financing — also 
have helped the weapons industry (Guay, 2007, p. 49). 
Globalization, by definition, increased the volume of trade between 
nations. While a major cause of growth and prosperity, expanding international trade has, 
by its very nature, increased economic specialization among nations. This has proven an 
especially sensitive issue when interdependence means loss of self-sufficiency in military 
production (Franck, Lewis and Udis, 2008, p. 12.) 
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Globalization, in many ways, has strengthened the hand of defense 
companies at the expense of national governments. With more opportunities to expand 
their international presence, governments, at times, are being required to make 
concessions that would have been unheard of even a decade ago … Of course, 
international arms sales were present and often vital for a company’s success, but exports 
almost were secondary, since they where a way to increase production runs, capitalize on 
learning from manufacturing processes for the home market, and lower overall per-unit 
costs. But today many companies are looking at foreign markets much sooner – or even 
instead of home markets (Guay, 2007, p. 64, emphasis in original.) 
D. DEFINING OFFSETS 
As stated earlier, the literature on offsets is complex and diversified. Despite 
being a global phenomenon, the terms and definitions on offsets are not consistent among 
the various authorities. Nonetheless, we aim to place the subsequent discussion of 
defense offsets within the wider context of reciprocal sales agreements. To that end, 
Turkish government terms, and reasons for offsets are introduced for further discussion 
of the issues. 
1. Offset Terms and Conditions 
Three conditions distinguishing an offset agreement are (a) purchasing 
government involvement, (b) supplier reciprocity and (c) preferential treatment.9. 
Purchasing government involvement means intervention through laws or public policy, as 
well as scrutiny of offset transactions during the approval processes. This may include a 
review of the offset arrangement to ensure that specific types of offsets (e.g., co-
production versus marketing services) are pursued, or that satisfactory arrangements are 
made to cover instances of non-fulfillment (e.g., payment of liquidated damages). 
Supplier reciprocity refers to the requirements of the purchasing government that obliges 
the supplier to contractually provide some form of additional, secondary compensation as 
                                                 
9 Three important characteristics distinguishing offsets as compensatory transactions are defined by 
Dr. Pompiliu Verzariu in a 2000 report and discussed in a Naval Postgraduate MBA Thesis by Joseph A. 
Milligan. 
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a prerequisite to the primary contract award. This reciprocity may be either an explicit 
statement or implicit understanding by a purchasing government that a contract award for 
goods or services will be based upon cost, schedule and performance as well as additional 
factors unrelated to the goods or services that the seller must provide as a condition of 
sale. Finally, preferential treatment refers to the privilege of the supplier as a result of 
agreement to provide reciprocal compensation. Preferential treatment may appear in a 
variety of forms, to include decreased tariffs, lower taxes, or favorable financing 
(Milligan, 2003, p. 10, emphasis in original). 
Two other general concepts underlie offset agreements (from a more contractual 
side) are identified as additionality / incrementality and casuality by Marvel. The concept 
of additionality or incrementality requires that for an offset activity to count as offset 
credit, the activity must be in addition to the activity that the offset obligor is already 
performing in the country. For example, if the offset obligor proposes to purchase $10 
million of printed circuit boards from Country X, it cannot count towards this $10 million 
any purchases of printed circuit boards it had already been purchasing. The other concept, 
casuality, requires that for an offset activity to count as offset project, the project must 
have been one that came about because of the offset obligor’s efforts. Thus, if a third 
party approached an offset obligor with the opportunity to claim offset credit for 
establishing a plant in country X (that the third party was already going to build there), 
the project could not count towards the offset obligation (Marvel, May 2001, p. 14). 
a. Academic Definitions 
Broadly speaking, the term “offsets” is used to describe any form of 
reciprocal exchange that takes place within the context of arms trade (Schmidt, 1989, p. 
vi). The history of the contemporary reciprocal trade agreements goes back to the 
beginning of the century. Various forms of reciprocal trade arrangements, whether related 
to civil or military goods, took place to date. The form and volume of these agreements 
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has always been dynamic but having significant characteristics10 due to the major global 
economic and political developments such as world wars, economic recessions, cold war, 
etc. 
Offsets in international trade became ubiquitous in sales of technologically 
advanced equipment beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s. (Franck, Lewis and 
Udis, 2008, p. 36) It is apparent that offset agreements are, in effect, a form of 
international trade policy or, more generally, industrial policy. Offsets arise in military 
aerospace industries because of the natural involvement of the governments in procuring 
an independent defense-industrial base. (Udis and Maskus, 1996, p. 172) 
Offsets are a range of industrial and commercial practices required as a 
condition of the purchase of defense articles and/or defense services. (Martin, 1996, p. 
31) 
The most common offset agreement commits the selling firm to perform 
some non-market requirement as a necessary condition for the sale. Such requirements 
vary widely, ranging from an agreement by the seller to purchase products and/or 
services from the buying country essentially unrelated to the equipment sale being 
negotiated, to explicit transfer of technology, investment, and various co-production 
arrangements. (Franck, Lewis and Udis, 2008, p. 36) 
As in the definition of offsets, there is not a universal classification system 
for offsets. The most common and general sorting is whether it is direct or indirect.  
Direct offsets are concessions made in goods and services directly related 
to the sales item. For example, (from U.S. perspective) Turkish production of an avionics 
subsystem to be installed within F-16s bought by Turkey would be a direct offset. An 
indirect offset is unrelated to the weapons being sold — e.g., payment for arms with, say, 
Saudi oil. (Schmidt, 1989, p. vi) 
                                                 
10 Anytime there is a crisis of sorts in the global economy, where trade is an important part of a 
country’s economic well-being, then compensatory (reciprocal) trade agreements of one sort or another are 
likely to become popular. This happened in the late nineteenth century, the depression of the 1930s, the 
immediate post-war period of economic recovery, and in the 1970s and 1980s because of oil shocks and 
global recession. “In an era of illiquidity, uncertainty, and global industrial realignment, countertrade 
appears to be an ideal mechanism for growth. (Hammond, 1990, p. 15). 
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b. Turkish Government Terms 
All governments purchase defense equipment and it is, therefore, hardly 
surprising that over 130 countries have some form of offset policy.11 (Martin, 1996, p. 3) 
Countries define offsets in different forms because of different motives and expectations. 
At the same time these definitions are changed and/or revised within time based on the 
economic, political developments and the experiences countries gained. 
The Turkish Government uses the terms ‘Offset” and/or “Industrial 
Participation” in order to address defense offsets. 1991 and 2003 Offset Guidelines -
prepared and revised by Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM-the Turkish 
acronym will be used) direct that offsets/industrial participation were to be defined as 
defense industry related exports and any other kinds of foreign currency inflows secured 
pursuant to agreement in order to compensate for the foreign currency shortfalls.  
In the Offset Guidelines revised in 2007, SSM defines the industry 
participation/offsets as activities secured in a project in order to use domestic industry 
capabilities, increase the competitiveness of national defense industry through exports, 
and constitute technologic cooperation, investment and R&D capabilities. 
The same guidelines classifies the offsets in three categories: category-A, 
category-B and category-C. Category-A refers to goods and/or services (within the 
related project) to be produced domestically (Local content). Category-B refers to the 
export (by Turkey) of defense, aeronautic and space related goods/services, and export of 
goods/services related to the contract. Finally, category-C refers to the technological 
cooperation, new and/or expanding investment, and R&D activities related to defense, 
aeronautics and/or other activities requiring advanced technologies. 
                                                 
With regard to giving and receiving offset work, each country can be allocated to one of these three 
groups. First, there is the USA that largely exports equipment and thus only gives offsets … Second, there 
is the small number of states that both import and export armaments and thus who both give and receive 
offset work. France, Germany and the UK are three countries that fall into this category … Finally, there is 
the large number of states that largely import defense equipment and who thus only receive offset work. 
(Martin, 1996, p. 4, emphasis in original) Turkey is one of the countries that fall into this category. (Ilbas, 
2001, p. 35). 
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The concept of offsets, especially in high-tech applications such as 
defense and aerospace, is defined as exports and other transactions providing foreign 
currency inflow to compensate for associated balance of payments. Nowadays, offsets are 
not only used as a means to increase standards of quality and productivity in domestic 
industries, creating local content, and producing goods and services that are competitive 
in the international arena. They are also used by industrialized countries to develop their 
defense industries and to augment their market shares12.  
2. Reasons for Offsets 
Countries have both economical and political motives for demanding and/or 
providing offsets. Results expected from offsets vary, depending mainly on the country’s 
policies. Considering the majority of the countries in the world are in the “offset 
receiving” group and about 60% of the world military spending belongs to developing 
countries, offset receiving nations are generally developing countries. It’s therefore 
reasonable to suppose that offset expectations are diverse. Developed countries with 
established defense industries use offsets to channel work or technology to their domestic 
defense companies. Countries with newly industrialized economies are utilizing both 
military and commercial related offsets that involve the transfer of technology and know-
how. Policymakers in the buying nations can use offset agreements to address a variety of 
economic and political issues. The desired effects are generally identified as: labor 
market corrections, promotion of capital investment, support for strategic industries, 
adjustments for asymmetric information, reduction of risk and uncertainty, alternative 
sources of financing, and political support for defense purchases.  
The dynamic and complex nature of offsets as an industrial tool is an essential 
factor to be considered while analyzing the underlying motivations of offset. Declining 
military budgets, the effects of the globalization on defense industries and increasing 
competition rendered the arms trade more critical for the major, high-technology firms 
and accordingly increased the bargaining positions of the developing nations – resulting  
 
                                                 
12 See activity areas on SSM website: http://www.ssm.gov.tr/EN (Accessed 25 September 2008). 
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in increased use of offsets. Additionally, the ongoing RMAs brought new defense firms 
into the global market. Overall, reasons for offsets are continuously revised both by the 
developed and developing nations. 
Turkey is a developing country with an emerging defense industry. The initial 
goal in the mid 1980s was to compensate for foreign currency shortfalls occurring as a 
result of defense related procurements. The revised policy in 2007 considers offsets as a 
tool in order to meet Turkey’s strategic goals. In a more detailed expression, offsets are 
used to enhance the use of domestic industry capabilities, increase the competitiveness of 
national defense industry through exports, and constitute technological cooperation, 
investment and R&D capabilities.  
3. Arguments for Offsets 
International organizations regulating trade between nations consider reciprocal 
trade as limiting the gains from free trade. Since the arms trade is not governed by WTO 
rules, offsets have an almost sacrosanct niche. However, GPA (a plurilateral agreement 
between WTO members) restricts the use of offsets in other government procurements.  
Another international concern about offsets is that they may increase arms 
proliferation. Arms proliferation is a global concern, especially for weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), mines, small arms, and technically advanced weapons. Offsets can 
potentially accelerate this proliferation through sales, co-production, and technology 
transfer. (Ilbas, 2001, p. 20) However, offsets involve the legal (and registered) transfer of 
arms and the subject arms proliferation is therefore subject to various regulations. 
Offset providers, such as U.S., have concerns about economic impacts and the 
scope of the technology transfers provided through offsets. However, the reports trying to 
sort out the economic effects of offsets-especially on employment- suggests that offsets 
have limited effects on the economy. Another concern is that offsets increase the cost of 
the contract, administrative and transaction costs — introducing overly bureaucratic 
rules. Nonetheless, countries demanding offsets tolerate these in pursuit of policy goals. 
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Overall, offsets are still an accepted practice among both sellers and purchasers 
alike, and are likely to remain so for the indefinite future. (Hammond, 1990, p. 84) 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter sought an empirical overview of offsets within international and 
arms trade. Since an offset is an international transaction, international trade theory and 
policies are involved (even if indirectly). Before discussing offsets in detail, the main 
characteristics of the arms trade and the recent developments in arms trade environment 
are provided. Finally the terms and conditions, reasons and arguments for offsets are 
discussed. With the background provided, the distinction of the defense offsets within the 
wider context of the reciprocal trade is warranted.  
The following chapters examine the offset policies in selected countries, offset 
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III. OFFSET IMPLEMENTATIONS AND POLICIES IN THE 
WORLD 
A. OVERVIEW 
Developing countries, such as Turkey, who are buyers in international arms trade 
market, have their own motives and objectives for offsets. These motives can be: 
• Acquiring new technologies and capabilities through technology 
transfer13,  
• Establishment of national defense industrial base, 
• Increasing self-sufficiency and reducing inter-dependence, 
• Reducing trade deficit, 
• Easing foreign exchange shortages, (Martin, 1996, p. 19) 
• Creating employment and production possibilities for domestic labor and 
industry, (Franck, Lewis and Udis, 2008, p. 39) 
• Creating14 and increasing competitiveness of domestic industry in global 
arena, 
• Political concerns15, 
• Public policy issues16 
• Alliance cohesion17 
                                                 
13 There is also a spillover effect of technology transfer. After initial establishment the technology will 
diffuse throughout the economy, stimulating economic growth. (Martin, 1996, p. 38) 
14 Offset requirements enable participants to a) sell goods, which, because of their poor quality would 
not normally be sold in export markets; and b) increase export of other goods through access to new 
markets. (Martin, 1996, p. 21). 
15 Procurement choices, particularly those involving large sums of taxpayers’ money, are made in the 
political market place where various interest groups seek to influence decision-makers. (Martin, 1996, p. 
40). 
16 Although U.S. government procurements may not be labeled as offsets, U.S. acquisition regulations 
function similar to the offset requirements imposed by Taiwan, Turkey, Spain, Greece, and other countries. 
For example, the U.S. government often requires contractors to use small, disadvantaged, minority-, and 
female-owned subcontractors as a condition of reward. In reality there is discernable difference between 
this requirement and the offset requirements of South Africa, a nation that often requires offset obligors to 
create projects that benefit small, micro and medium enterprises. (Marvel, May 2001, p. 13). 
17 Offsets are a method of forcing a two-way street in defense trade between the U.S. and its NATO 
allies. The two-way street concept is based upon the notion that alliance cohesion would best be served by 
sharing the economic benefits derived from defense production. (Schmidt, 1989, p. xi). 
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There are some types of factors such as foreign exchange rates, perception of 
national security environment, level of industrial development, level of economic growth, 
offset experience, etc. (Franck, Lewis and Udis, 2008, p. 39) affecting the motives 
described above. These factors have different degrees of effect over the time depending 
on the environment.   
On the other hand, developed countries, such as U.S., UK and Germany who are 
generally sellers but sometimes buyers, perceive offsets as a marketing mechanism to 
create competitive advantage to win international arms sales contracts. Offset offers from 
seller countries are recognized as a competitive discriminator by buyer countries. 
Accordingly, multinational companies began using offsets as a global business 
development tool. (Marvel, April 2001, p. 21) Seller countries also consider possible 
reputation effect they can gain because of successful offset agreements.18 
According to the most recent data from the Stockholm International Peacekeeping 
Research Institute (SIPRI) 41 U.S. companies accounted for 63 per cent of the combined 
arms sales of the Top 100 arms sales of $315 billion in 2006 (SIPRI, 2008). Studying the 
U.S. approach toward offsets is therefore important.  
Many countries are using offsets, but there is not a global authority mandating or 
regulating offset practices and procedures. Consequently, every country institutionalizes 
its own offset requirements. Some countries implement formal regulations, publish 
policies, structure systems, and mandate offset contract clauses. Other countries 
implement and impose these policies at the request of procurement authorities. (Barry, 
April 2001, p. 21) Every country has different objectives pursued through offsets (e.g., 
emphasis on improving industrial base or technology transfer) and these objectives may 
change over time depending on the experiences gained by countries from previous offsets 
(e.g., shift in Spain’s approach from indirect to direct offsets, which will be discussed 
later in this chapter) and recent changes and developments in the world. Studying and 
understanding other countries’ approaches towards offsets as well as their reasons and 
                                                 
18 In the first decade and a half or so of its life, most informed stories in the press referred not to the F-
16 but to the “General Dynamics F-16.” This helped motivate the General Dynamics Corporation to ensure 
that transfer of technology to partner states were successfully conducted to minimize the risk of a high 
accident rate besmirching the GD name. (Franck, Lewis and Udis, 2008, p. 39). 
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policies to implement offsets helps formulating the incentives for arms buyer countries, 
therefore;  understanding Turkey’s motives and policies to require offsets in weapon 
systems procurements. 
B. U.S. OFFSET POLICY 
The policy of U.S. toward offsets changed over time, according to changes in the 
world and perception of these changes by executive and legislative branches. The main 
policy drivers may be identified as the desire of Department of Defense (DOD) to 
maintain national defense industrial base and to avoid unnecessary friction with allies. 
(Milligan, 2003, p. v) Primary concerns for politicians are the perceived loss of jobs 
resulting from offsets and adverse effects of technology transfers. 
Views on offsets are quite controversial in the U.S. Defense offsets are generally 
viewed as a key competitive measure for foreign arms sales resulting in increased level of 
business and production, and decreased unit cost for prime contractors. As Schinasi noted 
on her testimony before the Committee on Armed Services: U.S. contractors consider 
offsets an unavoidable cost of doing business overseas. Contractors indicate that if they 
did not offer offsets, export sales would be reduced and the positive effect of those 
exports on the U.S. economy and defense industrial base would be lost. These positive 
effects include both employment in the U.S. defense industry and orders for larger 
production runs of U.S. weapon systems, thus reducing the costs to the U.S. military. 
(GAO, 2004) 
While offsets have their benefits, they also have some adverse effects on the U.S. 
economy and industrial defense base. Offsets may result in long-term supplier 
relationships with foreign companies for U.S. contractors. On the one hand, the U.S. 
contractor might have found a less costly supplier. On the other hand, U.S. subcontractors 
may find reduced business opportunities, resulting in the loss of capability in the U.S. 
industrial base. (GAO, 2004) William Hartung reported that “Due to the growing practice 
of providing industrial offsets to U.S. arms clients, many major arms deals now produce 
more jobs overseas than they do in the U.S. For example, components for the Lockheed 
Martin F-16 fighter are now being produced in ten foreign countries. There are nearly 
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twice as many workers employed building F-16s in Ankara, Turkey (2,000) as there are 
at Lockheed Martin's principal F-16 plant in the U.S., in Fort Worth, Texas (1,155).”19 
Another concern about U.S. offsets is the possible contribution to development of 
a future competitor by the means of technology transfer. A foreign company may develop 
the same capability it accessed as a result of a licensing agreement or technology transfer 
from an offset.. At the same time, national security concerns are directly related to 
technology transfer to foreign countries. 
Historically, the U.S. government has maintained a “hands-off” policy toward 
defense offsets, viewing them as a part of transaction between the contracting parties. 
(GAO, 2004) However, in recent years, U.S. policy makers began to recognize 
globalization as a tool for solving the problem of minimum acceptable number of firms in 
defense industry to ensure enough competition20. Foreign suppliers are to be regarded as 
full-scale candidates for prime contracts for major systems. The EADS/Airbus 
consortium (with Northrop Grumman as its North American partner) was encouraged to 
offer a proposal for a new U.S. Air Force aerial tanker, which won competition in March 
2008, but was protested immediately afterwards by Boeing. (Franck, Lewis and Udis, 
2008, p. 17) 
1. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Offsets in Defense Trade 
Report21 
Every year the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) prepares a report on the impact of offsets in defense trade as required by section 
                                                 
19 Summary of this report can be reached at http://www.ncf.ca/ip/global/coat/26/usa/us23 (Accessed 4 
October 2008). 
20 The problem is that with scarcity of new production contracts, the market simply cannot support a 
base with: (a) a competitively attractive number of suppliers of (b) economically efficient size, and (c) 
within national borders, even U.S. borders. After downsizing, only two domestic firms (Lockheed Martin 
and Boeing, after acquiring McDonnell Douglas) could offer a credible proposal for the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF). (Franck, Lewis and Udis, 2008, p. 17). 
21 For more information see “Offsets in Defense Trade – Twelfth Report to Congress” (December 
2007) by U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security. 
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309 of the Defense Procurement Act (DPA)22. The report analyzes the impact of offsets 
on the defense preparedness, industrial competitiveness, employment, and trade of the 
United States. 
In order to assess the impact of offsets in defense trade, BIS collects data from 
U.S. defense firms involved in defense exports and offsets.  These firms report their 
offset activities to BIS annually. This report covers offset agreements entered into and the 
offset transactions carried out to fulfill these offset obligations from 1993 through 2006. 
Every year, U.S. companies report offset agreement and transaction data for the previous 
calendar year to BIS.  The 1992 amendments to Section 309 of the DPA reduced the 
offset agreement reporting threshold from $50 million to $5 million for U.S. firms 
entering into foreign defense sales contracts subject to offset agreements.  Firms are also 
required to report all offset transactions for which they receive offset credits of $250,000 
or more. 
The official U.S. Government policy on offsets in defense trade23 states that the 
Government considers offsets to be “economically inefficient and trade distorting,” and 
prohibits any agency of the U.S. Government from encouraging, entering directly into, or 
committing U.S. firms to any offset arrangement in connection with the sale of defense 
goods or services to foreign governments. 
C. OFFSET POLICIES AND IMPLEMENTATIONS OF OTHER 
COUNTRIES 
1. Malaysia 
Malaysia requires all offset obligors to transfer technology to its defense industry 
and to establish production facilities and assembly lines for the purchased products in 
Malaysia. Primary focus is on gaining technology for microelectronics, software, 
electronic warfare and composite materials. (Kilic, 2007, p. 21) 
                                                 
22 Section 309 of the DPA was amended in 1992, and the Secretary of Commerce was directed to 
function as the President’s Executive Agent for carrying out the responsibilities set forth in Section 309 of 
the DPA. 
23 (BIS, 2007, p. 1-2, 1-3). 
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Technology transfers are evaluated according to price, application areas, and 
nature of technology. An offset offer is not evaluated for the procurement project 
proposal if it does not include technology transfers. In addition to technology transfer, 
maintenance capability of system to be procured is mandatory to be provided by 
contractor. Malaysia expects to create employment and production possibilities for 
domestic industry, to increase export, and establish its own industrial defense base. 
Direct offsets promote industrial participation, co-production, co-design, 
maintenance, repair, and modernization, while indirect offsets promote establishment of 
knowledge creation centers and universities to support technologic development. (Avsar, 
2006, p. 37) 
Offsets are mandatory if defense procurement project exceeds $10 million. 
Minimum required offset rate is 50%. Penalty for non-performance is 8%. There is not an 
established multiplier rate, but; if offset offer includes direct foreign investment; 
multipliers24 are applied according to nature of project. 
2. Kuwait 
The Counter-trade and Offset Regulation published in 1992 is the basis Kuwait’s 
offset policy and implementation. This regulation was revised according to 
recommendations of World Bank in 2005. The Kuwaiti government aims to reduce its 
economic dependence on oil and increase the diversity of investments and industries by 
the means of offsets. Contractors can invest either in projects offered by Kuwaiti 
government or propose their own investments. (Avsar, 2006, p. 37) 
One unique aspect of the Kuwaiti offset system is that an offset project will count 
towards offset obligations regardless of its location, subject to acceptable Kuwaiti citizen 
participation. For example, in 1999 an obligor was able to provide investment capital to a  
 
                                                 
24 A multiplier is used to increase the value of an offset project when determining offset credit. For 
example, if a company helped facilitate a $10,000 export of a product with particular importance, the 
country could offer a multiplier of 5, thereby increasing the amount of offset credit to $50,000. (GAO 2004, 
p. 1). 
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manufacturing company located in Turkey by a French company obligated to the 
government of Kuwait. The reason for this unique policy is Kuwait’s limited labor force 
and industrial base. (Marvel, May 2001, p. 18) 
Offsets are mandatory if defense procurement project exceeds $3 million. 
Minimum required offset rate is 35%. Penalty for non-performance is 6%. Multipliers are 
applied between 1 and 5 depending on the project. 
3. United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
The UAE’s offset policies require offsets for all defense procurements and for 
selected major civil purchases on a case-by-case basis. The nation’s law requires each 
procuring agency to involve the UAE offset authority when considering offsets. (Marvel, 
May 2001, p. 16)  Offset authority is the UAE Offset Group (UOG), which negotiates 
and evaluates contractors’ offset proposals and monitors performance and 
implementation of these projects.  
Indirect offsets are more common in UAE. Favored offset projects in UAE are 
investments by joint ventures of contractors and domestic companies in non-labor intense 
industries. The UAE, just like Kuwait, supports projects in the industries other than oil 
because it wants to reduce its economic dependence on oil and diversify its industries. 
(Avsar, 2006, p. 47) 
Offsets are mandatory if defense procurement project exceeds $10 million. 
Minimum required offset rate is 60%. Penalty for non-performance is 8.5%. Multipliers 
are not available. 
4. Republic of Korea (South Korea) 
South Korea has implemented offset policies and counter-trade to maximize its 
benefits from defense procurements since 1985. Defense Procurement Agency (DPA) is 
responsible of offsets. Latest revision to offset policy was made in 2003. South Korea’s 
objectives of offsets are:  
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• Acquisition of defense related advanced technologies, 
• Export of parts and components of weapon system being procured, 
• Gaining depot level maintenance and repair capability, 
• Exporting maintenance and repair capability to foreign countries, 
• Becoming a partner in major R&D projects. (Avsar, 2006, p. 47) 
Technology transfer is the main focal point of South Korea in both direct and 
indirect offsets. Public agencies, private companies and other institutions (e.g., 
universities) review the technology to be transferred by procurement of new weapon 
systems, and submit a technology evaluation reports to DPA. Contractors have to provide 
an annual schedule as well as details and conditions for technology transfer in their 
proposals. Additionally, technical drawings, blueprints, diagrams and pictures of 
technology to be transferred have to be included in proposals. (Kilic, 2007, p. 23) 
South Korea requires technology transfer to be free of charge and to transfer all 
rights to technology to South Korea permanently. Acquired technologies are protected 
according to patents, laws and regulations of South Korea.  
Offsets are mandatory if defense procurement project exceeds $10 million. 
Minimum required offset rate is 30 percent. Penalty for non-performance is 10 percent. 
Multipliers are available through 1 and 6. 
5. Brazil 
Brazil is intended to reach the following objectives through offsets: 
• Improvement of defense industrial base, 
• Creating employment and business opportunities, 
• Increasing competitiveness of domestic industries, 
• Finding new markets for Brazilian export products. 
Priorities for investments and technology transfers for offset, in accordance with 
the objectives stated above, are modernization of aerospace industry by technology 
transfer and utilization of foreign investments to increase technologic and industrial 
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capabilities. Brazil, like South Korea, relies on technology transfer as a key policy 
objective for both direct and indirect offsets. (Kilic, 2007, p. 20) 
Brazil tries to be as flexible as possible during negotiations to obtain enough 
portion of business for aerospace industry by technology transfer. For example, French 
government provided Embraer (a Brazilian company) with an extensive technology and 
source codes transfer for development and production of Mirage 2000 BR aircrafts. 
However, Brazil had to bear the burden of increased production cost in Brazil against its 
competitor countries as a result of gaining complete access for technology from France. 
(Kilic, 2007, p. 20) 
Offsets are mandatory if defense procurement project exceeds $5 million. 
Minimum required offset rate is 100%. There are not pre-determined multipliers, which 
enables Brazil to be flexible to choose the projects and multipliers to its favor to 
maximize its objectives. 
6. The Netherlands 
The Netherland’s offset authority is Commissariat for Military Production (CMP) 
within the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs. Offset projects are typically related 
to the defense industry, which consists of numerous small and medium companies. These 
small companies focus principally on components and subsystems for defense prime 
contractors outside the Netherlands. Offset projects thus tend to include export 
considerations. The Netherland’s offset authority’s priorities are to: 
• Directly involve Netherlands defense industries in defense acquisitions; 
• Form international, cooperative work share agreements; 
• Facilitate corresponding counter-purchases of components from the 
Netherlands defense industry; 
• Encourage investments in Netherlands defense industry; and 
• Promote exports. (Marvel, May 2001, p. 19)  
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Offsets are mandatory if defense procurement project exceeds  €5 million. 
Minimum required offset rate is 100%. Multipliers are available through 1 and 10. 
Penalty is either 15% or 30%, and, contractor must still fulfill obligation. (BIS, 2007) 
7. The Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic formalized its offset policy in 200025. The policy aims to 
increase levels of foreign investments in the Czech Republic. The drafters of the policy 
viewed offsets as a way to: 
• Acquire new technologies; 
• Increase employment opportunities; 
• Enhance sustainable economic development; and 
• Effectively further “the economic interests of the Czech Republic.” 
The Czech Republic experienced major changes in its industry, from large heavy 
industries to small and medium enterprises, because of the end of Cold War in 1989, 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and separation of the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia from Czechoslovakia. Therefore, government formulated objectives of offsets to 
complement the overall governmental policy of employment, regional development and 
industrial development. Compensation for the loss of manufacturing opportunities and 
jobs incurred by the Czech economy is considered one of the key objectives of industrial 
cooperation. All other objectives support government policies, like increase in the 
competitiveness of the domestic industry together with export capabilities, transfer of 
know-how and progressive technologies, stimulation of foreign investments and support 
of the establishment of joint ventures and long-term relationships. (Pargac, 2006) 
The Czech Republic uses the term “Industrial Cooperation Program” (ICP) for its 
offset program. The ICP applies to acquisitions from a foreign contractor whose value 
exceeds $23 million, or where a foreign subcontractor’s contract signed with a prime 
                                                 
25 The Ministry of Industry and Trade consulted with government officials from European allies, such 
as Great Britain, France, Finland, and Denmark, and held several conferences on the utility of offsets for 
the Czech Republic with representatives from both private industry and government. (Pargac, 2006, p. 23-
24). 
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contractor exceeds $11 million. The Czech government authorizes an interdepartmental 
commission to define offset requirements. This offset commission is appointed by the 
Minister of Industry and Trade for the purpose of coordinating activities and steps related 
to preparations, negotiations, enforcement, evaluation, implementation, and auditing.  
Offset value should equal at least 100% of the procurement value while direct 
offsets should account for at least 20% of the purchase price.  
8. Australia 
Australia’s offset policy is titled as “Australia Industry Involvement (AII) 
Program”. Investments resulting from offset agreements are categorized as those related 
to contract and those non-related to contract. Investments non-related to contracts, but 
aimed to increase capabilities of defense industry, are managed by Defense Material 
Organization (DMO) according to the Defense Industry Investment Recognition Scheme 
(DIIRS). Investments, which are included in the contract, are not counted for offset 
obligation, whereas, investments not included in the contract but related to procurement 
are accounted for industrial participation in accordance with industrialization plan. (Kilic, 
2007, p. 21) 
Technology transfers, R&D activities, direct and joint investments and multipliers 
to be applied to these activities are once set based on the industrialization plan and rarely 
changed afterwards. One aspect of the industrialization plan is to promote R&D activities 
of small and medium enterprises. 
Offsets are mandatory if defense procurement project exceeds $3.75 million. 
Minimum required offset rate is not set. There are not pre-determined multipliers. Penalty 
for non-performance is not set, but generally more than 10% of contract value. 
9. UK 
The primary focus of the United Kingdom’s (UK) offset program is participation 
by its defense industrial base. The country’s offset system is managed from within the 
UK Ministry of Defense, within the Defense Export Services Organization (DESO). 
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Compared to other offset authorities worldwide, this unique offset authority has two 
functions. The first is to promote the UK’s agenda in extracting offset projects from 
foreign contractors selling defense equipment and services to Britain. Second, the 
authority helps British defense and aerospace companies create offset projects that will 
help them sell their products and services outside UK. Consequently, DESO is both 
domestically and export oriented. (Marvel, May 2001, p. 20) 
Domestically, DESO works closely with trade a trade association, the British 
Defense Manufacturers Association (BDMA). The vast majority of projects approved by 
DESO will tend to be defense oriented joint ventures, technology transfers, component 
sourcing, and directed procurement. DESO also helps various private defense 
manufacturing companies to establish offset projects to assist their sales to other 
countries. 
• The UK’s offset system evolved to focus on: 
• Creating a regional “spread” to the UK defense industrial base; 
• Encouraging product diversifications for UK defense companies; 
• Encouraging a wider company base for defense manufacturing; and 
• Globalizing the UK defense company manufacturing base. (Marvel, May 
2001, p. 19) 
The Defense Industrial Strategy or DIS is intended for a post-offset regime in 
defense trade. This may reflect the UK’s position as a defense exporter. However, the 
document is careful to identify core industries in which there must be UK participation in 
supplying defense goods. Among other things, this provides for a basis for future 
negotiations over offsets through industrial participation. While “offsets” label will likely 
not appear in future military sales agreements, those who sell to the British Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) will undoubtedly have to tie their proposals to furthering the purposes 
stated in the DIS. (Franck, Lewis and Udis, 2008, p. 121) 
Offsets are mandatory if defense procurement project exceeds £10 million; £50 
million for French and German companies in conformity with bilateral agreements 
(“reciprocal waiver agreements”). Minimum required offset rate is not set, but target is 
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100%. There are not pre-determined multipliers. Penalty for non-performance is not set, 
however there is strict enforcement of IP program. (BIS, 2007) 
10. Spain 
Spain is one of the countries to have a positive attitude towards offsets. Spain has 
been naming offsets as industrial cooperation for a while. Ministry of Defense is in 
charge of offsets but Ministry of Science and technology is also in coordination with 
MOD. Main objectives of this industrial cooperation policy are: 
• Consolidation of strategic industries; 
• Having capability to self-sustain maintenance and repair of weapon 
system to be procured throughout its lifecycle; and 
• Providing opportunities for domestic industries to compete in global 
market. (Avsar, 2006, p. 47) 
Spain provides a very good example for what is happening and changing in the 
offset arena as countries gain experience from previous projects and reflect those to new 
projects. When the Spanish offset agreement was negotiated in early 1980s, indirect 
offsets were much more important than direct variety. This resulted in a large number of 
countries involved in generally small offset activities. A significant effort was required to 
administer these operations, as each project had to be approved by Spanish Offset 
Management Office. The relatively small share of defense-related offsets (28% of total 
program value) was a disappointment, as was even smaller share representing technology 
transfer. 
Following the expiration of the formal contract period, a three-year “grace-
period” was negotiated; this contained substantial changes reflecting the experiences of 
the first decade. The emphasis shifted dramatically from indirect to direct offsets closely 
associated with the F-18 aircraft. The nature of these offsets had to be agreed upon in 
advance, so that the Spanish were no longer simply reacting to suggestions initiated by 
McDonnell Douglas. (Franck, Lewis and Udis, 2008, p. 53) 
 44
Spain is a good and successful example of how a country can implement offsets to 
enhance its defense industrial base. In the early years of F-18 program, Spanish industry 
had only a limited capability to handle the direct work on the aircraft. The Spanish 
defense industry was fragmented, technologically weak, and largely state-owned. To 
correct this situation, the Spanish Government began to incorporate local industry into 
defense research activities. From the mid-1980s to 1991, government support of defense 
R&D had climbed from insignificant levels to nearly 30% of total Spanish government 
R&D outlays. 
These efforts had repercussions beyond F-18 and served to bring the capability of 
the Spanish industrial base closer to the level of its neighbors. Spain became a player in 
various European collaborative arms design and production programs – including the 
European Fighter Aircraft (Typhoon) project, which by the early 1990s was absorbing 
more than 3/5 of total Spanish defense R&D. It should be noted that the companies 
receiving the bulk of this investment were largely those that had been most involved in 
the F-18 direct offset activities. (Franck, Lewis and Udis, 2008, p. 54) 
11. Israel 
Israel is one of the most significant countries in the world to use offsets. Even 
though Israel signed Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) under the terms of 
World Trade Organization, Israel is the only country to oblige counter trade for civilian 
procurements with a special exemption from WTO. Israel uses offset for both military 
and civilian procurements very actively. Industrial Cooperation Agency (ICA) is 
responsible for monitoring, coordination, and implementation of counter trade 
agreements related to all governmental procurements. 
The objectives of Israel from counter trade and offsets are to; find new markets 
for Israeli goods and increase export, establish long-term cooperation between Israeli and 
foreign forms, and promote R&D projects.  
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Israeli firms are assigned a 15% price advantage26 in government procurements. 
Foreign firms have to provide “industrial cooperation commitment” along with their 
proposals for government procurements. If a foreign firm is awarded for the contract, it 
has to get its industrial cooperation commitment authorized by ICA, for contracts 
exceeding $0.5 million, before signing the contract. Minimum offset rate is 35% of the 
procurement value. At least 20% Israeli subcontractor involvement is required for 
contracts exceeding $5 million. Penalties are not monetary for non-performance; instead, 
company unable to perform industrial cooperation commitment is banned from entering 
future contracts. (Avsar, 2006, p. 43) 
D. SUMMARY 
The objectives that a country tries to obtain from offsets can be inferred simply 
from the name of its offset policy without knowing the objectives of that policy (e.g., 
Australia Industry Involvement). The structure (organization, multipliers, penalty, 
minimum offset rate), a country organizes to manage offsets, influences the types of 
offsets it will receive. It is also important to analyze the context of a country to better 
understand its motives and objectives for offsets, for example; Kuwait and the UAE are 
trying to reduce their economic dependence on oil while the Czech Republic is trying to 
rebuild its heavy industry it had before the end of Cold War.  
It is not surprising that offset policies and implementations evolve and become 
more sophisticated over time. Some factors, affecting a country’s offset policy, are static 
(e.g., size and geographic location of a country) and some are dynamic (e.g., experience 
level, industrial base, strategic policy). Examination of these dynamic factors as well as 
other changes and developments in the world helps to understand the evolution of offset 
policies within countries.  
Studying and understanding other countries’ approaches towards offsets as well as 
their reasons and policies to implement offsets helps formulating the incentives for arms 
buyer countries, therefore;  understanding Turkey’s motives and policies to require 
offsets in weapon systems procurements. 
                                                 
26 In a procurement, where Israeli and foreign firms compete against each other, Israeli firms would be 
awarded even if their price is 15% more than other firms. 
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V. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF TURKISH OFFSET 
POLICY 
A. OVERVIEW 
Turkey has been involved in offsets for almost 30 years, which reflects the 
evolution of offset policies as well as establishment and development of the national 
defense industry base. This chapter starts with an overview of the Turkish defense 
industry; it then summarizes the history of Turkish offset applications in the context of 
established organizations, published documents and national policies. An evaluation of 
the official offset regulations published by SSM is warranted. Finally the outlook for 
Turkish offset applications will be discussed. 
B. OVERVIEW OF TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
The first initiative in establishing a defense industry in Turkey goes back to the 
period of the Ottoman Empire. Defense industry had a strong position up until the 17th 
century but couldn’t keep up with European technical and industrial developments, and 
had lost much of its capabilities starting from the 1st World War. (Ozcan, 2006, p. 12) 
No major national defense industry developments occurred until the early years of 
the Republic of Turkey; and those which were limited to establishment of new facilities 
near Ankara based on the needs of the Independence War. The new Turkish government 
placed a high priority on the defense industry in its industrialization plan. Even though 
industrialization got high priority, a strong industrial base could not be established due to 
Turkey’s domestic conditions and global economic conditions. 
Development of a national defense industry was halted after the 2nd World War, 
as a result of foreign grants and aids mainly from U.S.27 that increased after Turkey 
                                                 
27 The Truman Doctrine is a proclamation by Harry S. Truman, President of the United States on 
March 12, 1947It stated that the U.S. would support Greece and Turkey economically and militarily to 
prevent their falling under Soviet control. 
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became a NATO member. Therefore, Turkey became completely dependent on U.S. and 
NATO aids to meet the requirements of the armed forces. 
Turkey also faced a number of delicate situations in a short period of time, like 
the Cyprus crises of 1963 and 1967, and the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974. The arms 
embargo which followed the Cyprus Peace Operation reminded Turkey of the necessity 
to establish and develop a national defense industry base. The deadlock experienced in 
this period caused Turkey to seek alternative ways to reactivate its national defense 
industry.  
Accordingly the Turkish Armed Forces Strengthening Foundation28 was 
established in 1974, and facilitated opportunities to invest in defense industry. Although 
these efforts resulted in enterprises such as ASELSAN (1975), ASPILSAN (1981), and 
HAVELSAN (1982), it was soon realized a modern defense industry could not be 
developed without other initiatives. (Yarman, May 2008, p. 19) 
In the 1980s, a state initiative was undertaken to modernize the Turkish Armed 
Forces and to establish a national defense industry. The first step was the establishment 
of Defense Equipment Directorate as a state enterprise. However, the shortcomings 
stemming from its state-bound status proved fatal, and all the properties of that enterprise 
were transferred to SSM — which was established in 1985 under Law No: 3238. It is not 
surprising SSM requested offsets for all defense procurements, first as a tool of financing 
to compensate for the cost of the procurements, and establishing a national defense 
industry.  Later offsets were used as tools for developing the defense industry, and finally 
to reach Turkey’s strategic goals. 
In this period, major defense procurement projects such as F-16 (1987), Armed 
Personnel Carrier (1988), Mobile Radar Complex (1990), Electronic Warfare Equipment 
for F-16, HF/SSB Radios, CASA Light Transport Aircraft (1991) were undertaken. A 
number of defense industrial companies were established with foreign capital  
 
 
                                                 
28 This foundation consisted of sub-foundations for Army, Navy, and Air Force. 
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contributions such as TAI (1984), TEI (1985), MIKES (1987), FNSS (1988), MARCONI 
KOMUNIKASYON (1989), THOMSON – TEKFEN RADAR (1990) to carry out the 
new projects29. 
Over the 23 years since its establishment, SSM has made real achievements in the 
creation of a modern national defense infrastructure, with highly successful results in 
critical areas. Key defense industrial institutions have been established to meet the 
requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) through local sources, each of which 
fill an important gap in their scope of activity.  
Additionally, some important capabilities have been obtained in the framework of 
the projects and industrialization activities. These capabilities are technology 
infrastructure, export capability, strengthening sub-sectors, restructuring industry, and 
expertise. Turkish defense industry is now able to manufacture world-class products and 
has a wide research and development program. 
Turkish defense companies can meet 25% to 30% of the TAF annual 
requirements based on 2007 data. Total sales and exports of Turkish defense companies 
are presented in Table 2 for last four years. What SSM achieved in defense industry is 
very significant considering Turkey was not able meet any of its defense needs 
domestically 30 years ago. 
YEAR SALES EXPORTS 
2004 1,337.120 196,341 
2005 1,591.162 337,422 
2006 1,720.405 351,989 
2007 2,260.758 250,154 
Table 2.   Turkish defense industry results ($ million) (From SASAD 2007 report) 
                                                 
29 SaSaD, Defense Manufactures Association, http://www.sasad.org.tr/main.asp (Accessed 2 October 
2008). 
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SWOT analysis, presented by Goknur Pilli at SSM Offset Conference in 2007, for 
Turkish defense industry provides a useful means to assess the industry’s current 
position. 
• Strengths: Experienced engineering workforce, lessons learned from 
previous projects and SSM’s support to indigenous defense industry, 
• Weaknesses: Lack of enough qualified labor (engineering for R&D) to 
meet local Defense Industry growth, 
• Opportunities: In-country development and R&D projects in parallel to 
SSM’s strategic targets for 2011, 
• Threats: Insufficient priority to indigenous defense industry products and 
services 
C. OFFSETS IN TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
1. History of Offsets in Turkish Defense Industry 
Turkey’s first offset implementation occurred in 1973 when the hulls of fifth and 
sixth submarines were manufactured in Golcuk naval shipyard as a part of purchase of six 
submarines from German company IKL/HDW. (Gencturk, May 2008, p. 18) However, 
the F-16 procurement program in 1984 was the first significant project where offsets 
were implemented. The program was implemented and monitored under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Defense (MoD). The Undersecretariat of Treasury and 
Foreign Trade actively participated at the steps related with the export of commercial and 
industrial goods under the program. (Ilbas, 2002, p. 37) 
The first office for managing offset implementations was established in 1985 with 
the name of “Defense Industry Development & Support Office” (SAGEB). The 
establishment of this office was based of the Law no. 3238. Its name was changed to 
“Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM)” with the same duties, responsibilities 
and authorities: managing and coordinating offset implementations for Turkish defense 
procurements. 
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Defense Industry Law (Law no. 3238), ratified by Turkish Parliament in 1985, is 
very important as an expression the serious intention of the government to develop a 
national defense industry base and to accordingly implement offsets for defense related 
procurements.  
SSM, an institution capable of formulating long term policies and principles for 
defense offsets was established with this law. This law stated domestic suppliers should 
be facilitated to the maximum extent practicable for foreign arms procurements, pointing 
to offsets. In addition to introducing a totally new approach and mindset for the Turkish 
Defense Industry, the law has also established a highly flexible and efficient 
administrative mechanism. The five main pillars are the Defense Industry Executive 
Committee30, Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, the Defense Industry Support 
Fund31, Defense Industry High Coordination Council and Defense Industry Control 
Committee.32 
SSM (Undersecretariat for Defense Industry): 
Established in 1985, SSM is the only authorized institution for defense offsets in 
the Turkish government. The main goal of SSM is to constitute a modern defense 
industry in Turkey and to facilitate the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces. An 
authorized department for defense offset implementations was very beneficial to 
accelerate the new applications established by Law no. 3238, to integrate private industry 
with public defense industry.  
The main tasks and responsibilities entrusted to SSM are as follows:  
• To carry out decisions of the Defense Industry Executive Committee,  
                                                 
30 The main decision making body of the system, Defense Industry Executive Committee is headed by 
the Prime Minister, and includes the Chief of General Staff and the Minister of Defense as its members. 
The Executive Committee has been tasked with the critical decisions relating to defense industrial issues 
and major defense procurement projects. Another responsibility of the committee has been to render 
possible nation-wide coordination between all entities with a defense industry dimension. 
31 The Fund was envisioned as the purpose-built financial instrument to enable SSM to carry out its 
tasks. A highly flexible and non-bureaucratic mechanism with a constant flow of financial resources is in 
full and independent control of SSM. Among the main incomes are; allotments from the corporate tax, fees 
and levies imposed on alcoholic and tobacco products, and all forms of chance games and betting, lottery 
etc. 
32 For more information see http://www.ssm.gov.tr/. (Accessed September 2008). 
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• To reorganize Turkish Industry in accordance with the prerequisites of 
defense industry,  
• To plan production of modern arms and equipment at private and public 
sector enterprises,  
• To undertake research and development of modern arms and equipment, 
to have their prototypes built, to make advance payments, to plan advance 
orders, and determine other financial and economic supports,  
• To coordinate export and offset trade issues relating to defense industry 
products. 
The mission of the SSM is: to meet the requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces 
and the government organizations that promote national defense; to establish and 
implement strategy and procedures for the development of defense industry. 
The vision statement of SSM is: to be the procurement authority leading a Turkish 
Defense Industry that is competitive, integrated with the international market and 
introduces uniquely indigenous defense solutions in accordance with technological 
improvements.  
SSM is also responsible for publishing official documents to set guidelines both 
for foreign contractors and domestic manufacturers. As a result of experiences gained 
from offset projects and changes within global economy, it was considered necessary to 
publish official guidance to identify bureaucratic processes and evaluation criteria for 
offsets, to set guidelines for domestic and foreign companies, and to create a systematic 
approach for offset applications. Based on these needs, the first official document about 
offset applications was published at 1991 with the name of “Offset Handbook “. This 
handbook was revised in 2000 with the name of “Offset Directive”. Recently, the offset 
document was revised in 2003 and revised again in 2007 – with the name “Industrial 
Participation & Offset Directive”. 
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Gencturk33 believes that Turkish policy on defense related offsets can be analyzed 
in three periods: 
• 1st period,1984 to 2000: Offsets were implemented as a tool of financing. 
• 2nd period, 2000 to 2007: Offsets were implemented to develop the 
national defense industry base. 
• 3rd period,  from 2007:  Offsets were implemented to increase the 
competitive power of Turkish defense industry and to reach the strategic 
goals of SSM. 
a. Offset as a Tool of Financing (1984– 2000) 
The main purpose of the Turkish Government for both offsets related to 
acquisition of F-16’s and the other offsets managed by SSM (called as SAGEB then) was 
to provide foreign financing for the procurement projects. This purpose of offsets as a 
tool of finance manifested itself in the first official document, Offset Handbook, as a 
primary objective; “… to provide foreign currency through exporting defense products 
and the other related industrial products and foreign capital investments, consequently; to 
recover foreign currency flowing out because of the procurement to maximum extent 
possible” (Offset Handbook, 1991) 
Even though there was not an official published offset policy and some 
flexibility was provided on project basis during the projects realized from 1985 to 1991, 
uniformity was tried to be maintained throughout the projects. Offset definition and basis 
of implementation, based on traditional direct and indirect offset categorization were 
standardized with the handbook that was published officially in 1991. 
In addition to being regarded mainly as a tool for financing foreign arms 
procurements, offsets contributed to development of the national defense industry by 
providing technology and knowledge transfers between 1991 and 2000. Indirect offsets  
 
 
                                                 
33 Hasan Gencturk is the author of “Offsets in Defense Industries” thesis of expertise for SSM in 1989, 
which is the first study in this area in Turkey. 
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were more common than direct offsets in this period. It is not realistic to expect Turkey, a 
country with a developing defense industry, to demand a higher ratio for direct offsets for 
projects requiring high technology. 
In 1998, the Turkish government announced “Principals of Turkish 
Defense Industry Policy and Strategy” which restated that defense related offsets should 
be coordinated by one organization (SSM) within MoD in official government 
newspaper34 in conjunction with the development in defense industry base. This policy 
laid the foundation of first major revision, Offset Directive of 2000, to offset policy of 
SSM. 
The period from 1991 to 2000 was a time for learning, as well as 
completing the defense industrial infrastructure.  It was also a time for developing 
defense industrial policies. With the experiences gained from this period, SSM focused 
on selective offset applications, which contributed to defense industry directly, and 
started to prioritize the offset applications accordingly. Results from this period were 
incorporated in the Offset Directives of 2003 and 2007. 
b. Offsets as a Tool for Developing Defense Industry 
“Principles of Turkish Defense Industry Policy and Strategy” published in 
1998 and the “Offset Implementations in Defense Acquisitions Directive” (2000) started 
the second period. SSM was then tasked as the only organization for all defense industry 
acquisitions. SSM didn’t codify all the critical changes in official documents until 2003 – 
with 2000 to 2003 being a transition period. SSM focused on the direct offsets in 
directive published in 2000, albeit by using a traditional offset approach. 
The most important change realized in Offsets Directive of 2003 was the 
“Offset Credit System” (also named as “Temporary Crediting” or “Advance Crediting”). 
This was intended to support and encourage contractors for future offsets.. After 
contractors completed their obligations for the current offset, additional offsets provided 
would count towards future offsets. Therefore, SSM enabled the continuation of 
                                                 
34 Official Government Newspaper, June 20, 1998. 
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cooperation between Turkish defense industry and foreign companies even after the 
completion of the initial obligation which was one of the measures to assure integration 
of Turkish defense industry to competitive international market by the means of 
cooperation. 
The main objective during this period was to strengthen the national 
defense industry base. Accordingly, multipliers were assigned to technology transfer type 
of offsets. Turkish companies receiving technology transfers were obliged to SSM for 
their earnings from the transfer. This idea would be defined as “monetary limits” in 
Offsets Directive of 2003. SSM, considering the level of national defense industry 
development, eased requirements for offsets by counting the total amount of exports if 
local content exceeded 51%. 
The new priority in the Offset Directive of 2003 was “…to increase the 
capacity and capabilities as well as to increase the market share and the competitive 
power of the national defense industry in the international market …” Consequently, the 
definition of the offsets was changed by replacing the traditional ideas of direct and 
indirect offsets with a set of prioritized categories. Transition period that started in 2000 
became more significant by using four categories in the directive of 2003. Exporting the 
products and services of the defense industry was the first priority, and entering new 
markets in the international arena was considered imperative for development of the 
national defense industry. Technology transfers were no longer seen as a priority any 
more and thus were defined as Category Four offset transactions (due to the difficulties 
encountered during implementation). 
The Offset Credit System that was enacted in the Directive of 2000 was 
expanded by allowing firms having no contracts with SSM to take on offset projects and 
have these projects counted toward future offset obligations. 
c. Offset as a Tool for Reaching the Strategic Goals (2007 – 
Future) 
SSM made significant changes to offsets policy, reviewing it according to 
the objectives of the “2007-2011 Strategic Plan”. SSM emphasized the use of offsets as a 
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critical and selective tool in its strategic plan, based on the relation between the success 
of offset applications and current development of the national defense industry. SSM 
expanded the definition of offsets to include local content. The latest directive is named 
“Industrial Participation and Offset Directive” and was published in February 2007. The 
number of the categories for offsets defined at the previous directive was reduced to three 
from four. 
Latest offset directive classifies the offsets in three categories; category-A, 
category-B and category-C.  
• Category-A refers to goods and/or services (within the related 
project) to be produced domestically (Local content).  
• Category-B refers to the export (by Turkey) of defense, aeronautic 
and space related goods/services, and export of goods/services 
related to the contract.  
• Finally, category-C refers to the technologic cooperation, new 
and/or expanding investment, and R&D activities related to 
defense, aeronautics and/or other activities requiring advanced 
technologies. 
Multipliers for export offsets were reassigned with software exports 
assigned with a single multiplier, instead of varying multipliers for different software 
qualifications in previous directive. While the highest multiplier was assigned for 
platform exports, lower multipliers were assigned for sub-parts and components at 
subcontractor level — in line with the development of defense industry. 
One of the conveniences provided with new directive is cancellation of the 
mandatory added value re-payment required from domestic firms realizing the benefit of 
technological cooperation and R&D offsets. This regulation prevents increases in costs 
and decrease of the competitive advantage for Turkish companies that need technological 
cooperation. 
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Increased multipliers for exports from small; and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME) are applied as national defense industry mainly consists of such 
enterprises rather than a few major companies. 
The minimum threshold for offset obligation is increased to $10 million, 
or equivalent, and the offset obligation is calculated over the total value of project rather 
than import portion. Inclusion of local content to the offset definition can be interpreted 
as SSM recognizing that the national defense industry base had increased its international 
competitiveness. However, it is also possible that SSM wants to increase Turkish 
competitive advantage in international markets, and to accelerate the integration by not 
assigning multipliers for local content portion. 
Another innovation adopted by the new directive of 2007 is allowing a 
foreign company with offset obligations in Turkey to exchange this obligation with a 
Turkish company that has offset obligation in that foreign country. This approach is 
intended to stimulate Turkish defense companies to pursue opportunities abroad more 
actively and is a concrete example of SSM’s increasing support to defense companies 
entering new markets. 
2. Analysis of Offset Documents by Published SSM 
SSM is the only authority for defense offsets and therefore responsible to set 
guidelines for offsets. SSM published four directives for offsets to capture previous 
experiences, reflect recent changes in government strategies and policies, and 
development level of national defense industry.  
a. 1991 Offset Handbook 
Main objectives sought in 1991 offset handbook are encouraging foreign 
currency inflow through foreign investments, saving national funds by transferring 
technology, increasing indigenous production capability, and enhancing the quality and 




investments, technology, license and know-how transfers, R&D activities and joint 
ventures with foreign companies are categorized as indirect offsets. Some key points of 
this handbook are as follows: 
• A foreign company can not transfer its investment to a third party 
until 10 years after realization of the investment. 
• Multipliers between 2 and 4 are applied to investments and 
technology transfers according to their type. An additional 
multiplier of 2.5 is applied if the investment is in a prioritized 
development region. The multiplier for R&D activities is 5. 
• Profits earned through foreign investments are counted as indirect 
offsets if they are re-invested domestically. 
• Exports of goods produced by Turkish companies as a result of 
foreign investment are credited as indirect offsets for 10 years. 
• Companies benefiting from technology, licenses and know-how 
transfers have to accept becoming obligated to MoD and SSM for 
revenues earned as a result of these activities. 
Investments in defense industry and technology transfers are categorized 
as indirect offsets. In other words, even if technology transfers and foreign investments 
are directed towards development of the national defense industry, they are treated as 
indirect offsets. It seems reasonable to conclude that these activities have a lower priority 
according to 1991 Offset Handbook. (Kilic, 2007, p. 29) 
b. 2000 Offset Implementation Directive for Defense Acquisitions 
The main objectives pursued in the 2000 offset directive are similar to 
those in the1991 offset handbook. However, existing or new foreign capital investments 
are classified as defense related and non-defense related, and multipliers are assigned 
accordingly. Technology, license and know-how transfers, R&D activities, and joint 
ventures were still categorized as indirect offset, as they were in the 1991 Offset 
Handbook. Some key points of this directive are as follows.    
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• A foreign company can not transfer its investment to a third party 
unless 5 years pass after the realization of investment. This was 10 
years in the previous directive. If a company withdraws its 
investment before completion of 5 years or without notifying SSM, 
offset credit will be cancelled and company will pay 10% annual 
penalty. 
• Activities related to technological cooperation under offset 
obligation must include technologies compliant with U.S. and EU 
norms. 
• If a foreign company transfers technology or contracts for R&D 
activities with a Turkish company, that company is obliged to pay 
back 50% of the offset transaction (before multipliers are applied) 
without interest to Defense Industry Support Fund in USD or 
Euros in a 5 year period. Even though this regulation was intended 
to provide a method for Turkish companies to assess the value and 
quality of technology transfer, this regulation discouraged 
technology transfers in practice. 
• SSM, considering export potential of offset related goods, may 
require export guarantees. 
• The multiplier for defense industry investments is 3, and 2 for non-
defense industry investments. If investment is in a prioritized 
development region, a multiplier of up to 8 is applied. 
Technological cooperation has a multiplier between 3 and 6; R&D 
activities have a multiplier between 5 and 8. 
Comparison of 2000 Offset Directive and 1991 Offset Handbook shows 
that even if the multipliers and investment areas are expanded; the 1991 handbook 
mentality is maintained, since investments and technology transfers are still categorized 
as indirect offsets. (Kilic, 2007, p. 31) 
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c. 2003 Offset Implementation Directive for Defense Acquisitions 
The official definition of offsets is changed by discarding the traditional 
definitions of direct and indirect offsets, and using definitions with categories based on 
priorities. Four offset categories are defined as: 
• Export of defense industry goods and services 
• Export of prioritized industrial goods and services35 
• Export of other industrial goods and services 
• Technological cooperation, investment, R&D and training 
activities 
Although it may look like a new system, this categorization is simply a 
different form of traditional direct versus indirect offset categorization. Export of defense 
products and services is the first priority based on the idea of accessing new markets in 
the international arena is imperative for development of national defense industry. 
Technology transfers are not seen as a priority any more and thus are defined as category 
four offset transactions due to the difficulties encountered during previous projects; 
receiving lowest multiplier when offset credit is calculated. Some key points of this 
directive are as follows: 
• 50% payback rate, set in 2000 directive, for Turkish companies 
receiving technology transfers or R&D activities resulting from an 
offset is reduced to 30% to 50% range and payback period is 
prolonged from 5 to 6 years to provide more flexibility. If recipient 
company is government owned, payback can be in form of goods 
and services. 
• Investing foreign company can not transfer this investment to a 
third party unless 5 years pass after the realization of investment. 
• SSM, considering export potential of offset related goods, may 
request export guarantee. 
                                                 
35 Prioritized or preferred industry products and services are available at SSM website 
http://www.ssm.gov.tr/EN/duyurular/proje/Pages/default.aspx. (Accessed September 2008). 
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• Multiplier for defense industry investments is 3, while multiplier 
for non-defense industry and high technology investments is 2. If 
investment is in a prioritized development region a multiplier up to 
9 is applied. Technological cooperation has a multiplier between 1 
and 5; R&D activities have a multiplier between 3 and 6. 
Payback rate at 30% - 50% range for Turkish companies receiving 
technology transfers or R&D activities resulting from a technologic cooperation offset 
made this type of activities hardly possible. As a matter of fact, no significant offset 
activity in this area after 2003 indicates misapplication of this aspect. (Kilic, 2007, p. 33) 
d. 2007 Industrial Participation/Offset Implementation Directive 
SSM defines the industrial participation/offsets (IP/O) as activities secured 
in a project to use domestic industry capabilities, increase the competitiveness of national 
defense industry through exports, and facilitate technologic cooperation, investment and 
R&D capabilities in this latest directive. 
The new categories associated with 2007 Directive were explained above. 
Some key points of this directive are as follow: 
• The payback regulation, which was one of the major barriers to 
technology transfers, is cancelled and SSM has the right to require 
export guarantee at the amount of offset value (before multipliers 
are applied) for technological transfer type of offsets. Cancellation 
of payback mechanism of 2003 directive and introduction of 
export guarantee instead can be interpreted as a constructive 
change for technology transfers. However, this application may 
pose a barrier to technology transfer unless flexibility for 
contractors and Turkish firms is provided in application.  
• The IP/O ratio to be committed by the contractor should be at least 
50% of the procurement agreement having a value $10 million (or 
equivalent currency amount) or more. 
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• Multipliers for technological cooperation, investments, and R&D 
activities are shown in Table 3. Reduction in multipliers from 2003 
directive coupled with the new requirement for export guarantee 
presents difficulties to stimulate contractors to mentioned areas. 
Technologic Cooperation, Investment, R&D Activities Multiplier 
System Integration 3 
Network, Information, Satellite and Sensor Systems 3 
Electronic Warfare 3 
Missile, Guide and Control 3 
For defense, aeronautics, aerospace industries and/or other 
areas requiring high technology; 
   A. Technological cooperation, 
   B. New and/or extended investment, 
   C. R&D activities 
2 
Investments in scope of  Advanced Technology Industrial 
Park and Airport (ITEP) Project 
2 
Table 3.   Multipliers for technological cooperation, investments, and R&D activities 
(From SSM, IP/O Directive, 2007) 
• Multipliers for exports are presented in Table 4. In case the exports 
are realized from SMEs, 1 is added to the multiplier to be granted. 
In case of the products whose R&D and/or design is realized in 
Turkey, 1 is added to the multiplier to be granted. In case of the 
export of the products produced for the first time in Turkey, 1 is 
added to the multiplier to be granted if the product is deemed 
critical by SSM. In the determination of the multipliers, the 
products related to the platforms, systems and sub-systems are 
identified by SSM. The highest multiplier that can be granted is 5. 
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MULTIPLIERS FOR EXPORT 
PLATFORM 4 
SYSTEM  3 
SOFTWARE  3 
SUB-SYSTEM  2 
PART-COMPONENT  1 
Table 4.   Multipliers for exports (From SSM, IP/O Directive, 2007) 
D. PRESENT AND FUTURE OUTLOOK OF TURKISH OFFSET POLICY 
The present objective of SSM is to encourage cooperation in high level 
technological areas that require a well qualified work force with low investment cost in 
order to market and sell the end product to other countries that will be a mutually 
beneficial business solution for domestic companies and contractors those would like to 
increase their competitive advantages. Turkish defense industry provides contractors 
long-term and mutually beneficial business environment, which brings more than the 
opportunity of just fulfilling their specific offset obligations. 
One of the main responsibilities and duties of SSM is to direct the funds, 
necessary for the maintaining Turkish Armed Forces’ needs, back to Turkish national 
industry. This imperative causes the projects realized in Turkish industry to have the 
highest priority.  
SSM has signed a total of 77 agreements its establishment in 1985. Twenty-two of 
these agreements were successfully completed and the remaining 55 agreements are still 
in progress. About $ 6.5 billion total amount of offset commitments have been 
undertaken by SSM, while 3.9 billion $ of them are direct offsets and 2.6 billion $ of 
them are indirect offsets. 
Analyzing completed offset commitments shows that realized amount of offset 
commitment for these projects is higher than contractual amount both for direct and 
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indirect offsets. Table 5 shows contractual versus realized values for completed direct 
and indirect offset commitments. Direct offset commitments were $1.29 billion in 
contract but realized as $ 1.35 billion at 105% realization rate. Indirect offset 
commitments were signed to be 1.82 billion but realized as $ 2.12 billion at 116% 
realization rate. Total contractual value for offset was $ 3.11 billion but realized as $ 3.47 
billion. 
 Direct Offsets Indirect Offsets Total Value 
Contractual Value 
($ billion) 
1.29 1.82 3.11 
Realized Value      
($ billion) 
1.35 2.12 3.47 
Realization 105% 116% 112% 
Table 5.   Realized versus contractual values of offset commitments 
Because, Turkey is a developing and growing country especially in technology 
and investment area, future benefits and profits from offset application will be bigger 
unless the systematical approach in offset area is abandoned. 
Figure 3 represents the remaining offset commitments by years. This figure also 
shows the importance of consistent and patient implementation of offsets; because results 























Figure 3.   Remaining offsets commitments by years (From Pilli, 2007) 
The future outlook of SSM and its offset policy is stated in “Strategic Plan for 
2007-2011”. SSM’s Strategic Goals for 2011 related to offsets are: 
• Restructure the defense industry to be able to provide unique local 
solutions and compete in the international arena 
o Increase the Turkish defense industry’s work share average to 50% 
in the frame of procurement projects36. 
o One billion dollars of export in defense goods and services37. 
o Harmonize the quality management systems of the defense 
industry companies with SSM’s quality policy. 
• Participate actively in the multinational defenses and security projects that 
promote the international cooperation 
o Participate at least in four multinational defense projects and lead 
at least to an international project  
                                                 
36 Current rate is around 41.6% (Bayar, 2008, p. 23). 
37 Defense export was 250,154 in 2007. 
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o Increase the participation of Turkish defense industry in the NATO 
defense projects by four times to current ratio. 
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Offsets played a key role in establishing and developing a national defense 
industry for Turkey. SSM is the expert organization for defense offsets — negotiating, 
signing, monitoring and implementing offset agreements and setting guidelines. It must 
be noted that SSM’s approach towards offsets changed in time in accordance with 
national policies, changes in global arena, and development level of defense industry. 
Strategic plan of SSM for 2011, along with the latest offset guideline “Industrial 
Participation and Offset Directive” published in 2007, sets the new direction for Turkish 
defense industry as to seek participation in international projects and accessing new 
markets. The JSF and A400M projects that are studied in next section are ideal examples 
reflecting this new direction of Turkish defense industry. 
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V. SELECTED PROCUREMENT PROJECTS WITH OFFSET 
IMPLEMENTATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The F-16 procurement project is a milestone in the development of Turkish offset 
policy, since it was the first major project involving offsets. The A400M and JSF projects 
reflect the present state and future direction in offset policies. The three major weapon 
procurement projects selected (out of 22 completed, 55 ongoing projects involving 
offsets) will be basis for case analysis--although limited in scope and depth.  They are, 
however useful for enhancing understanding of Turkish offset policy. Key facts, benefits 
and experience gained will be emphasized in each case analysis.  
B. THE F-16 PROJECT 
Turkey has sought advanced technologies by implementing offsets for its defense. 
In this manner, Turkey first started offset applications in the defense industry with the 
agreement signed in 1984, based on local co-production of 160 F-16 Fighting Falcons in 
Turkey. This first significant offset agreement signed with General Dynamics, the 
program was implemented and realized under the responsibility of the MoD. The 
Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade actively participated at the stages related 
with the export of national commercial and industrial goods under the program. (Altan, 
1999) 
The offset percentage was set at about 25% or $1 billion. In exchange for the 
purchase of 160 F-16 aircraft, General Dynamics agreed to allow the assembly of 152 
aircraft in Turkey using parts from United States and European, as well as from new 
Turkish plants co-owned by General Dynamics, General Electric, Turkish industry, and 
the Turkish government. General Dynamics also agreed to provide about $800 million in 
non-defense-related offsets, including investments in the Turkish hotel industry and in a 
thermal power plant project (Schaffer, 1998, p. 40). As a major export country, the U.S. 
administration examined Turkey’s requests for export license and technology transfer on 
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a case by case basis, rather than making general commitments, and related with this 
situation all critical equipment was produced in the United States and added to planes in 
F-16 fighter co-production in Turkey. 
Offset applications can be problematic with sole-source procurements. They 
should be evaluated very carefully, because applications may sometimes increase the 
overall price of the agreement. The reason for this risk is absence of competition. For this 
reason, offset applications should be evaluated separately for all projects when the 
procurement is done by a sole source. The offsets for the Turkish Air Force (TUAF) F-
16s are also an important example. Offsets at a rate of 50% of the sub-agreement 
supported procurement and modernization of TUAF F-16s. This rate meant about 500 
million USD and a majority of the cost of the project (which would be funded by Turkish 
government). Turkey then minimized deficits in the balance of payments associated with 
defense procurements. This offset application was a good example for the evaluation and 
application of the offsets separately at the procurements from sole sources. (Avsar, 2006, 
p. 86) 
When the F-16 offset agreement was first signed by Turkey, it wasn’t expected to 
be as a process as long and complicated as it turned out to be. The first F-16 offset 
applications started with General Dynamics in 1984 as a co-production and co-assembly 
program but it has expanded to include a number of different F-16 offset applications at 
various levels. After the initial procurement, the project became the most important 
modernization program Turkish Armed Forces requested. F-16 offset agreements can be 
separated and studied under following phases: 
1. Peace Onyx – I 
The procurement of F-16s was an important and expensive procurement project 
for Turkey. 132 F-16 Cs and 28 F-16 Ds at a total cost of $4.2 billion in 1983 were sold 
to Turkey for cash and a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) loan from the Pentagon. Related 
with this sale, a direct offset commitment of $150 million was signed on May 11, 1984, 
committing American General Dynamics to purchase components and parts in Turkey’s 
aerospace program directly or to provide training for it. General Dynamics agreed that 
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out of a total package of 160 F –16 C/Ds, the first 8 aircraft would be delivered from the 
General Dynamics production line in the U.S., with the remaining 152 aircraft to be 
delivered from Turkish Aerospace Industries’ (TAI) production line. On November 9, 
1984, General Dynamics signed an indirect offset commitment, agreeing to provide 
services and to export products from Turkey unrelated to the F-16 program. In addition, 
the firm committed to fund the setup of a new aerospace company, TAI. The purpose of 
this new company was to assemble and co-produce the F-16s in Turkey, and to provide 
support for the program including research, development, design, training, and servicing. 
(Ilbas, 2002, p. 54) 
General Dynamics set up TAI as a joint venture with Turkey and its principal 
subcontractor, General Electric Corporation, which manufactures F-16 engines. Of the 
$137 million required to fund the project, General Dynamics provided $58 million 
(42%); General Electric, $9 million (7%); Turkey, $68 million (49%); and the Turkish 
Air Force Foundation and Turkish Aeronautical Association put in the remaining $2 
million (2%). Thus, TAI was 51 percent Turkish owned and 49 percent U.S.38. 
General Electric helped create Tusas Engine Industries (TEI), a Turkish-American 
joint stock company, to manufacture engine parts and assemble the F110-GE-100 engine 
for the TAI F-16 production line. Assembly of engines and the manufacture of parts 
started in 1987. The start-up phase was completed with the co-production of selected 
parts by the end of 1989. Having successfully completed the start-up phase by the end of 
1989, TEI moved into the mature growth phase. TEI is now mature supplier of engine 
components in the global market. 
The Turkish government allowed General Dynamics to spend the $150 million 
direct offset commitment on the development of a whole town around the TAI complex. 
This included housing for 2,000 personnel working in the plant, a hospital, mosque, 
school, waste treatment plant, power plant, and roads, as well as job training. (Ilbas, 
2002, p. 55) 
                                                 
38 For more information see TAI website http://www.tai.com.tr/en (Accessed 20 October 2008). 
 70
The first plane rolled off the assembly line in October of 1987, ahead of schedule. 
Peace Onyx-I provided a ten-year plan to modernize the Turkish Air Force, to develop an 
indigenous aerospace industry, and to deepen Turkish-U.S. military relations. As with the 
creation of TAI, General Dynamics requested support for the offset commitment from its 
principal subcontractors, General Electric Corporation (making the engines) and 
Westinghouse (providing the radar). General Dynamics had overall responsibility for the 
$1.27 billion indirect offset but was able to sign separate commitments with General 
Electric Corporation for $317.5 million (25%) and with Westinghouse for $152 million 
(12%). (Ilbas, 2002, p. 55) 
The performance period was for ten years with a three-year grace period, which 
means that the offset was to be completed by 1994 or, with the grace period, by 1997. 
There is a complex penalty formula for noncompliance. A review period every two years 
was intended to smooth out the process, so that General Dynamics completed much of 
the commitment at the end of the performance period. 
The Turkish government published guidelines for indirect offsets, asking General 
Dynamics to fulfill 90 percent through the procurement and export of Turkish products 
and 10 percent through capital investment and the promotion of tourism in Turkey. When 
General Dynamics began to search for products to export from Turkey (such as cotton, 
textiles, and orange juice concentrate) they found the process difficult, time consuming, 
and expensive. General Dynamics could get only one dollar of offset credit for each 
dollar of product exported. In 1984 and 1985, the Turkish authorities began to change 
priorities. They started to believe that investment was worth more because of its inherent 
leverage. Since dollars invested in an industry (e.g., tourism area, a hotel) could generate 
far more cash than the original investment sum, Turkey began to encourage General 
Dynamics to invest more, even to reverse the percentage under the guidelines with 90 
percent to be fulfilled by investment. The incentive Turkey provided was awarding 
General Dynamics offset credit based on a multiplier formula. General Dynamics thus 
received offset credit, to be negotiated in each case, of several times the value of its 
actual investment. The leverage could be further increased since General Dynamics could 
use its reputation and network to enlist the support of investment partners.  
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The first indirect investment was in the Ankara Hilton Hotel, followed by one 
each in Izmir, in Mersin, and in Istanbul. The advantage to General Dynamics was that its 
money would generate a cash flow and eventually a profit once the investment was paid 
back. General Dynamics had put together another investment project in Turkey with 
Bechtel, the giant U.S. engineering and construction firm. General Dynamics invested 
about $20 million in a billion dollar thermal power plant project. Bechtel lead the 
construction but was joined on a subcontract basis by other investment partners, 
Combustion Engineering (U.S.), Siemens (Germany), and Royal Dutch Shell. General 
Dynamics expected to get $250-300 million in offset credit for this project, and the 
government guaranteed a 15-20 percent return on investment (Hickok, 2000). 
Under the Peace Onyx-I Program TAI manufactured and delivered 152 F-16C/D 
aircraft in Block 30 and 40 configurations at the TAI facilities to the Turkish Air Force 
between the years 1987-1995. The Program totaled 160 F-16s, eight of which were 
produced in the U.S. and delivered to Turkish Air Force.  
2. Peace Onyx II 
The development of TAI capabilities led to new goals for Turkish industry and 
defense authorities. The original Peace Onyx had transferred the necessary technology 
and know-how to establish a Turkish aerospace industry. The second co-production 
program of F-16 fighters, Peace Onyx-II was signed on 26 March 1992. At first, the 
contract called for the purchase of 34 F-16 C and 6 F-16 D Block 50 aircraft with a total 
estimated cost of $1.515 billion. In 11 February 1994, the contract changed with an 
amendment reflecting the shift from 40 to 80 aircraft. The first 40 planes were funded 
primarily by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Emirates in return for Turkey's cooperation in 
the Gulf War. A direct offset commitment of $133.7 million was signed, committing 
General Electric to purchase components in Turkey’s aerospace program directly. Within 
this project, a $256.2 million indirect offset commitment was signed. Maintenance 
hangars for F-100, F-129 and CT-7 engines were built and training was provided by 
General Electric to TUAF (Ilbas, 2002, p. 58). 
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Under the Peace Onyx-II program, TAI produced an additional 80 F-16C/D Block 
50 aircraft from 1995 to 1999. The manufacturing share of the company reached 80% 
with the addition of flaps, ailerons and the stuffing tasks for the forward fuselage to the 
airframe components manufactured in the first program. 
3. Peace Vector-IV 
In addition to the Peace Onyx program, TAI produced 46 F-16 fighters with a 
new program Peace Vector-IV for the Egyptian Air Force between 1993 and 1995 under 
an agreement signed between the governments of Turkey, the U.S.A. and the Republic of 
Egypt. This program is significant as it was the first delivery of F-16s to a third country 
from a manufacturer outside the U.S. (Ilbas, 2002, p. 59). 
4. Peace Onyx-III 
The Turkish and United States governments signed a letter of offer and 
acceptance on April 26, 2005 for the $1.1 billion modernization of Turkish Air Force F-
16s to a common avionics configuration. In line with an earlier government-to-
government agreement between the Turkish and the United States, the Pentagon on 
December 22, 2006 awarded the $635.1 million contract to Lockheed Martin to upgrade 
the TUAF F- 16 fleet39. Lockheed Martin has to perform its offset commitments until 
2016. 
The deal will be executed with oversight from the U.S. Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) program, with Lockheed Martin in Ft. Worth, TX serving as principal contractor, 
with the actual modification of the aircraft performed by TAI. The contract is for 
modification of 76 F-16 Block 50, 103 F-16 Block 40, and 37 F-16 Block 30 aircraft for 
TUAF. The agreement also includes flight testing, training, technical support and 
sustainment activities that continue the work started under the initial contract signed in 
July 2005.  
                                                 
39 Defense News  http://www.defensenews.com/ (Accessed 19 October 2008). 
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Although, some Turkish politicians brought up questions about the work that 
could have been done locally by TAI, economic and financial realities may not support 
these political ambitions. Sometimes more local industry work share means a higher 
overall price and delays in deliveries. Besides, there are some practical limits on the work 
share in programs related to technological or financial capabilities. As a result, the best 
solution for the country can be offsets, as seen in the Peace Onyx-III program. Work 
share for the rest depends on negotiations and trade-offs made by both parties.40 
TAI completed a total of 152 Block 30/40 F-16C/Ds for  TUAF (plus 8 delivered 
directly from the USA) under the Peace Onyx-I; 80 Block 50 F-16C/Ds (68 Cs and 12 
Ds) under the Peace Onyx-II; an additional 34 Block 40 Cs and 12 Block 40 Ds built for  
Egyptian Air Force; and finally modification of 76 F-16 Block 50, 103 F-16 Block 40, 
and 37 F-16 Block 30 aircraft for TUAF. The total production is 278 F-16C/Ds for 
TUAF, 46 aircraft for Egypt. 
The Turkish military achieved modernization at a relatively low price, but the true 
cost of the Peace Onyx story in terms of industrial competiveness and relations with the 
United States remains undetermined. For example, the F-16 offset agreement created a 
significant number of job opportunities for the national defense industry, as well as high 
level education and training for personnel. As a result, Turkey gained a quality labor 
force for its national defense.  
Turkey also gained very important industrial complexes, TAI and TEI, for its 
defense industry. In addition to assembling the F-16s, TAI manufactured the aft fuselage, 
center fuselage, and wings in Turkey. In this regard, the F-16 offset agreement introduced 
new technologies and export opportunities to Turkish defense industry. TAI produced 46 
F-16 fighters (Peace Vector-IV program) and sold them to the Egyptian Air Force 
between 1993 and 1995. TAI's experience includes not only the F-16 Fighting Falcon but 
also the CN-235 Light Transport Aircraft, SF-260 Primary Trainer, AS-532 Utility 
                                                 
40 For complete article see Defense News at: 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2476542&C=america (Accessed at 25 September 2008). 
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Helicopter, plus development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV-X1), Target Drones, 
Fighter-Surveillance Aircraft, Agriculture Aircraft and modernization activities41.  
In addition to component manufacturing, TEI benefited from establishment of 
depot level maintenance capability for miscellaneous engines and training received in 
critical defense fields. TEI has met all its delivery and quality commitments and is now 
producing parts for over 17 aircraft engines, as well as gas turbines for customers in the 
United States and Europe. TAI and TEI are good examples of working partnerships 
created by offset applications. 
Today, these factories are providing support for some current offset programs — 
including research, development, design, training, and servicing. The Turkish military 
achieved modernization at an affordable price — due to the success results of offset 
agreements. Also, a number of direct and indirect benefits have been realized, such as 
technology transfer, good international reputation, and new job opportunities in the 
Turkish national defense industry. 
C. A400M TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT PROJECT 
The A400M program is a direct result of a commonly expressed need by eight 
European air forces42 for a new generation military airlifter. The  A400M initiative aims 
to specify and procure a common aircraft is unique in European experience, and clearly 
points the way forward for "smart procurement" on a multinational scale. A consortium 
of European NATO members issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) in September 1997; to 
the response industry was the creation of the partnership now known as Airbus 
Military.43 
Turkey’s intention is to replace TUAF’s aging transportation fleet of C-160s with 
A400M.  The A400M is the first truly new military transport aircraft of its category in 
over 30 years; it has twice the capacity and twice the payload of current aircraft types, 
                                                 
41 For more information see TAI website http://www.tai.com.tr/en (Accessed 20 October 2008). 
42 Italy withdrew from program in 2003 leaving 7 European countries as partners. 
43 For more information on Airbus Military visit http://www.airbusmilitary.com/home.html (Accessed 
5 October 2008). 
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Even though offset agreements are not present in the A400M project, industrial 
participation leads to same basic results. Incentives for participating countries include 
compensation for the amount paid for the project, technology transfers, development and 
sustainment of the defense industry base, etc. The A400M program is considered to be an 
important step towards the integration of the Turkish industry into the European aviation 
industry. 
In May 2003, the contract, worth some 20 billion Euros, was signed between 
Airbus Military and OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en Matière 
d'Armement – Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation), representing Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey, and United Kingdom for a total of 180 
aircraft. In April 2005 South Africa ordered 8 aircraft, followed in December 2005 by a 
contract signed with Malaysia for 4 aircraft. Both nations became A400M program 
partners, bringing the total commitment to 192 aircraft. Airbus Military has rolled out the 
first complete A400M military transport aircraft from the Final Assembly Line facility in 
Seville, Spain on June 26, 200844.  
Overview: Designed to meet a recognized requirement for a new European 
airlifter, the A400M incorporates state-of-the-art materials. Features such as electronic 
flight controls, carbon composite structures and an automated handling system will bring 
new standards of operability and safety to military aircrews. 
Launched under a single contract in 2003 with 180 orders from seven European 
launch customers, the A400M represents the most ambitious military procurement 
program ever undertaken in Europe. As noted above, the launch customer nations— 
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Germany, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom — 
were subsequently joined by Malaysia and the Republic of South Africa. 
                                                 
44 The first flight of the Airbus A400M military transport plane will be delayed indefinitely. The first 
flight will have to wait until the engines, made by EPI Europrop International GmbH, are finished. 
http://www.aviation.com/business/080925-airbus-a400m-delay.html (Accessed 1 December 2008). 
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Figure 4.   Participating countries and their orders for A400M (From www.eads.net) 
The A400M project originated in 1983 when Aérospatiale, British Aerospace and 
Lockheed came together to form FIMA, the group originally responsible for studying the 
Future International Military Airlifter. In 1985 after the defense ministers of the 
Independent European Program Group (IEPG) agreed to harmonize their national 
requirements in a joint study, the IEPG became FLAEG, the Future Large Aircraft 
Exploratory Group.  Two years later, in 1987, Aeritalia (now Alenia) and CASA joined 
FIMA as the FLEAG drew up the Outline Staff Target. In 1989 Lockheed withdrew from 
the program, FIMA was disbanded and the organization was re-established as 
EUROFLAG. 
With EUROFLAG set up as a limited liability company in Rome in 1991, the 
FLA program progressed through pre-feasibility and feasibility studies in order to meet 
the European Staff Target (EST) issued by FLAEG. With this phase completed, 
EUROFLAG was dissolved in 1995 and the program placed under the responsibility of 
the Airbus Military core team in Toulouse as the European Staff Requirement was 
finalized by the participating nations. 
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In 1996, a single-phase commercial approach was presented to the participating 
nations and the ESR was issued, followed by a Request For Proposals (RFP) from seven 
NATO nations. In January 1999, the FLA became the A400M with the establishment of 
Airbus Military Company S.A.S, the organization that presented the full technical and 
commercial proposal for the aircraft to the MoDs as a response to the RFP. 
In December 1999, the nations decided in favor of the Airbus Military proposal 
and designated the A400M as their future large military transport aircraft. Successive 
announcements by the partner nations followed during the year 2000 as budgets were put 
in place, parliamentary procedures expedited, and commitments to aircraft numbers 
announced. It was agreed in June 2001 that OCCAR would be the contracting body 
acting collectively for the nations in contract negotiations and in December of the same 
year a contract was signed between Airbus Military and OCCAR.  
Organization: Airbus Military was established in January 1999 to manage the 
European A400M military transport aircraft project. The company was re-structured 
under its current name, Airbus Military SL (Sociedad Limitada) prior to the contract 
signature in May 2003. Its shareholders today comprise AIRBUS, EADS, TAI of Turkey 
and FLABEL of Belgium. 
Airbus Military is the prime contractor for the A400M program and represents the 
single point of contact between the customers and industry. It holds the contractual 
responsibility to honor price proposals, performance guarantees and delivery dates. 
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Figure 5.   Organizational relationship of participant countries and industrial companies 
(From Airbus Military website www.airbusmilitary.com) 
As the Prime Contractor for the A400M Program and the Customer Interface, 
Airbus Military is also responsible for commercial activities including marketing, sales 
and contract administration; financial and administrative activities including cash 
management; procurement activities including the power plant and coordination for 
systems; and overall development program management. 
Contract administration is handled jointly on behalf of the customer nations by the 
European central procurement agency OCCAR. For A400M orders from export 
customers, contracts will be established on a bi-lateral basis between the nation 
concerned and Airbus Military. 
All activities related to A400M project conducted by OCCAR are reported to 
Program Committee consisting of representatives from 6 establishing members45. 
A400M program members who are not a member of OCCAR — only Turkey – are 
ensured to attend program management, establish legal, administrative and financial 
relations with OCCAR by the means of memorandum of understanding signed by 
participant countries. (Teker, 2006, p. 46) 
                                                 
45 Belgium (7 aircraft) and the Luxemburg (1 Aircraft) are represented as one country in Program 
Committee. 
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The industrial responsibilities of the partners are presently distributed in a manner 
similar to the Airbus partnership.  Aircraft sub-assemblies will be manufactured by the 
partners at different sites across Europe and delivered to the EADS Spanish facility in 
Seville for final assembly. Each participant is responsible for its own centre of 
competence and benefits from a percentage of the aero structures work-share in direct 
relationship to the number of aircraft ordered by its national government. 
Country Number of Aircraft Work-Share (%) 
Germany 60 33.33 
France 50 27.78 
Spain 27 15.00 
UK 25 13.89 
Turkey 10 5.56 
Belgium* 8 4.44 
Total 180 100 
Table 6.   A400M Participant countries and their work-shares 
Turkey as a participant country: Under the A400M program, a total of 10 A400M 
aircraft will be procured for the Turkish Air Force Command. To compensate for the 10 
A400M aircraft to be procured by Turkey, TAI will undertake a work-share of 5.56%. 
The structural work share which is corresponding to 7.15% of the total work and systems 
work package, which is 1.26%. 
As a partner of Airbus Military S.L., TAI has participated throughout the A400M 
project in the design and development activities with the leading European aerospace 
companies — Airbus (France, Germany, Spain and UK), EADS CASA (Spain) and 
FLABEL (Belgium).46 
                                                 
46 For more information on TAI and its participation in A400M project visit 
http://www.tusas.com.tr/en (Accessed 1 October 2008). 
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Since participant countries receive proportional work-shares for A400M program, 
traditional offsets are not present. However, participating countries that incurred the 
initial investment and non-recurring R&D costs will be able to get a share from the sales 
to other countries after 60th aircraft. Therefore, TAI and SSM expect to benefit from this 
program in various ways, including positive ROI (Return on Investment), job creation, 
capability development, sustainment of indigenous defense capabilities and technological 
spin-offs. 
With this program, TAI has shifted to “build-to design” method from “build-to-
print.” Being a partner of Airbus Military S.L. (AMSL), TAI will not only own design 
rights, but also become a partner of Design Organization Approval under AMSL — 
which has design rights, in general, and type certificate. These approvals will make TAI a 
company that has control over all processes including design, test, certification and 
delivery.  
As a risk sharing partner in the program, TAI will manufacture the parts under its 
responsibility for each new aircraft order. The parts, which are the responsibility (design 
& production) of TAI are forward center fuselage, rear fuselage upper shell, parachute 
doors, emergency exit doors, tail cone, lightning and water/waste systems and aileron and 
spoiler. 
Special technology, know-how and experience is required for production of 
composite structural elements — which are more endurable and lighter compared to 
aluminum alloy material. The first A400M spoiler and aileron components are the largest 
composite parts, and are produced at TAI’s facilities. The A400M flight control surfaces 
are also the first components to be certified under TAI’s responsibility by the 
“International Certification” authorities. 
In addition to structural components, TAI is Level 1 responsible of the lighting 
and water/waste systems of the A400M program. Furthermore, the fuselage harness 
fitting of the A400M is also manufactured by TAI engineers. 
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TEI, a share holder of EuroProp International47, has a work-share of 2.45% in the 
engine design and production of A400M. TEI is responsible for manufacturing the front 
bearing structure, primary nozzle, and special testing equipment for TP400 engine. TEI is 
the only company to design and manufacture these parts. (Teker, 2006, p. 46) 
A400M is a highly important project. As stated by Oktay Tezsezen, general 
manager of TAI, it is the first global project with Turkish defense industry fully involved 
in design, development, and production and after sale support processes. Turkish defense 
and aviation industries will benefit from technological build-up, added domestic value, 
export potential, and employment opportunities. The A400M program is an important 
step towards the integration of the Turkish industry into the European and global aviation 
industry. 
D. JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROJECT 
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) project — involving both country-to-country and 
industry-to-industry relations— is unprecedented both in its scale and international 
character. The project is currently in the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) 
phase. The overall process, by its nature, does not involve offset commitments. Rather, 
“best value” is the basis for supplier evaluation in all phases of the project. Nonetheless, 
JSF is discussed in this chapter for two reasons. First, aviation is one of the most 
important instruments of national power, alliances, and defense industry 
capabilities.Therefore, JSF may provide insight into the future of several issues discussed 
in this study, such as arms trade and offset projects.  
Second, the partner countries’ incentives for joining the project (at the non-
operational side) have parallel characteristics to those gained with an offset commitment 
such as compensation of the amount paid for the project, technology transfers, 
development and sustainment of the defense industry base, etc.  
                                                 
47 EuroProp International is a consortium company formed by Europe’s engine manufacturers, and is 
responsible to design and manufacture the engines A400M’s project. TEI joined this project with Spanish 
ITP company. (Teker, 2006, p. 46). 
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Program Overview: The JSF program emerged in late 1995 from the Joint 
Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program, which began in late 1993 as a result of the 
Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of U.S. defense policy and programs. Having affirmed plans 
to abandon development of both the A-12/AFX aircraft that was to replace the Navy’s A-
6 attack planes and the multi-role fighter (MRF) that the Air Force had considered to 
replace its F-16s, the BUR envisaged the JAST program as a replacement for both these 
aircraft. In 1994, the JAST program was criticized by some observers for being a 
technology-development program rather than a focused effort to develop and procure 
new aircraft. In 1995, in response to congressional direction, a program led by the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop an advanced short 
takeoff and vertical landing (ASTOVL) aircraft was incorporated into the JAST program, 
which opened the way for Marine Corps and British Navy participation. (CRS, 2007, 2) 
The JAST program office released a request for proposals in March 1996. Shortly 
thereafter, the project name was changed to Joint Strike Fighter to focus on joint 
development and production of a next-generation fighter/attack plane. Three groups 
responded to the request: a McDonnell-Douglas-headed team joined by Northrop 
Grumman and British Aerospace (later absorbed into BAE Systems), a Boeing team, and 
a Lockheed Martin team. Later in 1996, the concepts submitted by Lockheed Martin and 
Boeing were chosen as finalists, and both firms started work on a demonstration aircraft. 
In October 2001, the X-35 of Lockheed Martin was declared the winning entry. 
Apparently the race was close, but Lockheed Martin's design was viewed as the less risky 
alternative. (Franck, Lewis and Udis, 2008, p. 70) Thus, the prime contractors of the 
program are Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems, Pratt & Whitney and 
Rolls-Royce48; an international team leaded by Lockheed Martin. Final assembly of the 
aircraft will take place at Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth plant in Texas.  
Three versions of F-35 aircraft are being developed: Conventional Take-Off and 
Landing (CTOL or F-35A), Short Take-off and Vertical Landing (STOVL or F-35B) and 
                                                 
48 Early production lots of all three variants will be powered by the Pratt and Whitney afterburning 
turbofan F-135 engine. Following production aircraft will be powered by either the F135 or the F-136 
turbofan being developed by General Electric and Rolls-Royce. http://www.airforce-
technology.com/projects/jsf/ (Accessed 14 October 2008). 
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the carrier Version (CV or F-35C); Turkey is interested in the CTOL version. The 
guiding principles of the JSF in design are advanced weapon systems49 and 
affordability50. 
 
Figure 6.   Defense Acquisition Management Framework (from CRS, 2007, p. 7) 
The project is currently in the SDD phase. Until late 2003, the JSF program’s 
SDD phase was scheduled to run until 2008, at which time full rate production was 
scheduled to begin, with a projected initial operational capability of 2010. However, 
schedule changes have added time and cost to the program. (CRS, 2007, p. 7, emphasis 
added) Excessive weight problems51 were the most significant among those experienced  
The overall program is planned to produce over 3000 aircraft for U.S. and partner 
countries at a cost of over $200 billion. However, over 5,000 aircraft are expected — 
                                                 
49 The report of Franck, Lewis and Udis provides detailed information about the design parameters of 
the aircraft. Also see http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/jsf/ for a detailed explanation of JSF 
design parameters.  
50 A main goal of the program from the U.S. perspective has been to find further ways to reduce costs, 
given the shrinking defense budgets and increasing price of high technology component. The focus of the 
program is affordability - reducing the development cost, production cost, and cost of ownership of the JSF 
family of aircraft.” In order to achieve this welcome set of goals, commonality among the services was 
essential, and the aircraft is now set to replace F-18 C/D’s of the Navy and Marines, AV/8B Harriers of the 
Marines, and F-16 and A-10 fighters from the Air Force. Current plans call for 2,458 aircraft in three 
different versions, but with 70-90% commonality of components and systems to reduce manufacturing 
costs. (Reinhard, 2006, 79). 
51 To address growing weight problems encountered in the development phase, DoD extended the 
SDD phase one year, and correspondingly delayed the F-35’s scheduled first flight from late 2005 to the 
summer of 2006 (first flight occurred on December 15, 2006), and the beginning of low-rate initial 
production shifted from 2006 to 2007. (CRS, 2007, p. 7). 
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including FMS sales. It is the largest defense project yet undertaken. Procurement is 
planned to continue until 2026 (and beyond) with a possible service life through 2060 (or 
beyond). 
Organization: The JSF program involves international participation and unlike 
recent programs, such as F-16, this participation begins with the early stages rather than 
the production phase. 
According to Kapstein, the industrial structure (and the organizational structure in 
effect) of the JSF program is a reflection of the market realities at the time project was 
initiated. International collaboration in the JSF program was primarily driven by an 
American concern with capturing foreign market share at a time when domestic defense 
procurement budgets in the U.S. as well as the defense budgets worldwide were rapidly 
falling and the European defense companies were more competitive52 in international 
arena. From this point of view, JSF’s promise of promising jobs and technology transfers 
would make the project politically attractive.  
A 2003 GAO report defines the underlying incentives of the program’s 
participants in a more detailed way. Through negotiated agreements with partner 
countries which define specific roles and responsibilities for participants, the United 
States expects to benefit from sharing program costs, gaining access to foreign industrial 
capabilities, and improving interoperability with allied militaries. Partner governments 
expect to benefit through defined influence over aircraft requirements and improved 
industrial relationships with U.S. aerospace companies through access to JSF contractor 
and subcontracting competitions. Finally, a major benefit for partners is having their 
personnel physically located within the program office with access to program 
information and contractor data. (GAO, 2003, p. 1) 
                                                 
52 In fact, the affects of globalization and ongoing RMA, those defined in the first chapter of this 
study, are the key issues for the increasing competitiveness among defense firms worldwide. The European 
defense firms- Britain’s BAE SYSTEMS and the Franco-German firm EADS- were more powerful rivals 
as a result of mergers and acquisitions in a climate where companies had to put more emphasis on 
international arms trade for sustainment. At the same time similar projects were initiated such as Swedish 
Gripen, French Rafale and multinational Eurofighter.  
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The strategy involves three levels of partnership arrangements and a Security 
Cooperation Participation level utilizing foreign military sales procedures. (Schreiber, 
2002, 165) Participation of a country in an early level of the program does not guarantee 
participation in the further phases or purchasing the aircraft.  
Responding to the coming Air Force requirement for a new-generation fighter to 
replace the existing F-4 and F-16 fleet beyond 2012, Turkey joined the Concept 
Demonstration Phase (CDP) of the JSF Program in 1999 and signed the international 
memorandum of understanding (MOU)53 document for the SDD Phase in 2002 as a 3rd 
level participant, with an amount of 175 Million USD. Further, on 12 December 2006, 
the Defense Industry Executive Committee selected F-35 as the Turkish Air Force’s 
future combat aircraft and decided to participate in the JSF PSFD (Production, 
Sustainment, and Follow-On Development) Phase by signing the PSFD MOU. The MOU 
document has been signed by Minister of National Defense Vecdi GÖNÜL on 25 January 
2007 at The Pentagon and approved by Turkish Parliament (TBMM) on 27 March 2007. 
(SSM, 2008) The other participant countries and their contributions to the project are 
shown in table 7. 
 
 
Table 7.   JSF Partner Financial Contributions And Estimated Aircraft Purchases 
(From GAO, 2003, p. 10) 
                                                 
53 These agreements identify the roles, responsibilities, and expected benefits for all participants and 
are negotiated for each acquisition phase. (GAO, 2003, p. 7). 
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As shown in Figure 7 the levels of participation facilitate Government-to-
Government arrangements as well as continuation of Industry-to-Industry relationships 
initiated in the early phases of the program.  
 
Figure 7.   JSF Program Relationships (From GAO, 2003, p. 7) 
The benefits derived by Partners at each of three JSF partner levels are directly 
proportional to their investment. At the government-to-government level, the applicable 
non-recurring R&D cost recoupment charge54 for each aircraft purchased is waived for 
level 1 and level 2 partners, and for the level 3 partners the amount of their investment is 
credited toward their applicable non-recurring R&D cost recoupment charge and the 
remainder will be considered for waiver on a case-by-case basis … Also, proportional to 
the amount of a partner country’s SDD investment, Partners will share third party levies 
on the JSF aircraft produced for Foreign Military Sales customers. (Schreiber, 2002, 166)  
At the same time, the representatives of the partner countries, assigned to different 
Integrated Product Teams within the JSF program office, act like an interface between the 
                                                 
54 R&D cost recoupment charge relates to demanding that foreign buyers pay their ‘fair share’ of a 
project’s R&D costs – for foreign military sales, providing export weapons with a direct subsidy from U.S. 
taxpayers. (Kapstein, 2004, p. 149). 
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program office and ministries of defense. Level III partners have one program office staff 
member and no direct vote with regard to requirement decisions. 
At the industry level, the strategy is formulated for international competition 
rather than directed country workshare or offsets for affordability and best value reasons. 
After deciding to award work to foreign and domestic companies based on competition, 
instead of cost shares contributed, DOD and the JSF Program Office have left 
implementation approach to Lockheed Martin under the standard Federal Acquisition 
Regulation clause related to competition in subcontracting. (GAO, 2003, 23) The same 
report states55 that Lockheed Martin’s approach for supplier selection is based on factors 
such as a supplier’s ability to incorporate a management approach that is responsive to 
maintaining JSF schedules, reducing design and production cost within acceptable risk 
levels, developing a solid technical approach with opportunities for technology 
improvements, reducing aircraft size and weight, and increasing aircraft performance. 
Another major point is based on the fact that this approach is being implemented without 
regard to a supplier’s country of origin, with U.S. and international suppliers competing 
equally. 
Based on a 2003 report by DoD regarding the industrial participation in JSF 
project, 55% of the total value of the JSF work in the SDD phase will be subcontracted 
and a further 15% is expected to be subcontracted once the fighter goes into production. 
Also global sustainment of the F-35 Aircraft will be globally executed via Autonomic 
Logistic Global Sustainment (ALGS) System, and will be centrally managed by the U.S. 
Government and Lockheed Martin as the single point of accountability. The scale of 
work and economic opportunities offered to potential suppliers, the project aims for win-
win outcomes.  
However, a diverse set of challenges related to the international character of the 
project have been experienced, and it is reasonable to predict more throughout the project 
life based on a vast range of political and industrial issues.  
                                                 
55 Based on the interviews with Lockheed Martin officials.. 
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Three of the problems, as stated by GAO (2003), are the most significant. First, 
while international partners can choose to share any future program cost increases, they 
are not required to do so under the terms of the negotiated agreements. Further, they have 
not been required to contribute any additional funding despite changes to the scope of the 
program. From this point of view, the recent changes in the cost and schedule added 
complexity to the program management. Second, technology transfer issues also present 
challenges for the JSF program. Due to the degree of international participation at both a 
government and an industry level, a large number of export authorizations are necessary 
to share project information with governments, solicit bids from partner suppliers, and 
execute contracts. Finally, while the JSF Program Office is responsible for ensuring that 
program objectives are met for all participants, Lockheed Martin bears most of the 
responsibility for managing partner industrial expectations. Partners have identified 
industrial benefits as vital to their participation in the program. If return-on-investment 
expectations are not met, the program is likely to lose political support in the partner 
countries. To realize this return, a partner industry must win JSF contracts through 
competition, which is a departure from other cooperative programs. In one sense, this is a 
contradiction with the program goal of avoiding offsets. Although international 
collaboration aims to create a free-trade environment, the expectations of the partner 
countries and program execution must be balanced. This might lead to reciprocity — 
promising work to guarantee the further participation;, this sounds like an offset 
transaction. 
Turkey as a partner country: Prior to signing the PSFD MOU, Turkey had all 
options open for the country’s next-generation fighter: JSF only, Eurofighter only, or a 
combination of both. The F-35 program was chosen to get the most value at the lowest 
cost. Partnership status was desired because of positive impacts expected for the Turkish 
military industrial base. This impact is expected to be realized in various ways, including 
positive ROI, increased national value in acquisition, job creation, capability 
development, and technological spin-offs. 
The industrial return target is determined as “minimum 50%” in the JSF project 
that is going to cost Turkey approximately $10.7 billion with a projected procurement 
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amount of 100 F-35A aircraft. (Bayar, 2008, 22) However, Turkey lacks a large, fully-
developed aerospace sector and has a limited number of defense companies listed on the 
Global Project Authorization (GPA)56 signed.  
Nevertheless, Turkish Defense Industry has gained significant capabilities with 
the previous defense projects managed by SSM in the recent twenty years. By 2008, the 
overall requirements of Turkish Armed Forces are provided through domestic industry 
capabilities at 41.6% level. Also, export capabilities of the industry have increased57 as a 
result of the design and development projects employed from the beginning of 2000s. 
SSM has used various support mechanisms to help Turkish defense companies 
identify, bid for, and win contracts from the very beginning of the project life. The JSF 
Turkish Industry Coordination Team, assigned by SSM, is in charge of enhancing the 
communication between the Turkish companies and JSF top-tier contractors and 
following the nearing opportunities in the Program. This group coordinates and connects 
the respective points of contact within both groups. Furthermore, SSM has provided $325 
Million of funds to help qualified domestic defense companies improve their 
infrastructure. At the same time, a strategy has been initiated by the joint efforts of SSM 
and Turkish Air Force to ensure the use of domestic military and civilian capabilities for 
the sustainment of the system in the ALGS framework.  
Currently (2008) industrial participation for the next 25 years has reached $5.5 
Billion. The major portion of this work belongs to TAI; the second tier supplier of sub-
assemblies for the centre fuselage at a monetary value of approximately $3 Billion. At the 
same time, seven Turkish defense companies, including TAI, have been granted work for 
the project. However, the workshare is not at the desired level for electronics and 
                                                 
56 A GPA is conducted under a Government-to-Government agreement or a Defense-to-Defense 
MOU, between the U.S. and a foreign country. Eligible end users are the Defense Departments of the U.S. 
and the foreign country, and companies serving as their sub-contractors. The GPA allows pre-qualified 
U.S. firms to enter into Implementing Agreements (see below) with pre-qualified JSF foreign partner firms, 
for exchanges within the approved scope of the GPA.  It can cover a broad range of defined activities, 
including multiple shipments, extended periods of defense service support, and re-exports 
http://www.innovation.gov.au (Accessed 28 October 2008). 
57 Defense exports between 1997 and 2007 were approximately $3Billion. While the total exports 
were $138 Million at 1997, it increased to over $350 Million at 2006 and $420 Million at 2007. (Bayar, 
2008, p. 23). 
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software related contracts. The projected amount of $1 Billion for ASELSAN, one of the 
key players of Turkish defense industry, has not yet been reached. Thus, this will be one 
of focus areas for the industry related efforts at the near term. (Bayar, 2008, p. 22) 
Discussion of Turkey’s defense related offsets should emphasize the country’s 
efforts to improve its defense industry. As discussed earlier, offsets are not used as a 
finance tool to compensate for the cost of major weapon system acquisitions. Rather, 
offsets are considered as complementary58 in a toolbox of indigenous projects, R&D 
oriented programs, acquisition reforms and joint ventures. These are all intended to 
further the development of the domestic defense industry as well as making that industry 
a key international player. 
According to Murat Bayar59, Turkish Defense Industry has completely matured 
its views regarding indigenous development; thus the SSM goals for procuring major 
systems include initiating indigenous projects for enhancing critical industrial 
capabilities. If indigenous projects are not cost effective or feasible, the second choice is 
joint development, perhaps with multinational collaboration. Finally, co/licensed 
production and other offsets (in order to gain workshare) will be the demanded when 
those priorities cannot be met. This tendency can be observed through the following 
speech60 taken from an international conference (regarding Indigenous Solutions to 
TAF’s Future Requirements) sponsored by SSM. 
In today’s world, developed countries are more focused on the indigenous 
solutions, mutual development and international cooperation projects to 
meet their defense weapon systems requirements. Depending on the 
experiences regarding the foreign dependency and being aware of the 
benefits of the indigenous or joint development models for Turkey, buy 
off the shelf and co/licensed production models are being diminished. 
Indigenous development projects (of Turkey) like Trainer A/C and 
Unmanned Air Vehicle Development projects, joint development  
 
                                                 
58 As stated in a 2005 conference (Offsets in Turkish Defense Procurements) sponsored by SSM at 24 
May 2007, offsets have been a facilitator for the defense offsets. Nevertheless, the new challenge was 
introduced as “export without offsets” in the same conference. 
59 Chief Executive of SSM. 
60 This speech comes from Ahmet Metan, the Business Development Director of TAI. 
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programs such as Europe’s Transport Aircraft A400M and NATO-AGS 
and international participation projects as Joint Strike Fighter can be 
considered as a leading model for this tendency. 
Therefore, it is assessed that it is going to be more beneficial for us to 
participate actively and on time in joint projects initiated mainly by U.S.A 
and EU and other countries while both developing indigenous solutions 
and meeting large volume development costs and time. Other than this, 
seeking the international participation to the Turkish development projects 
should be evaluated as an alternative target as well. 
E. SUMMARY 
The F-16 project, as Turkey’s first major offset implementation, displays all the 
Turkish government’s objectives for offsets in early stages, such as  cost compensation, 
establishment of key defense companies like TAI and TEI, creation of new employment 
opportunities, technology transfer, and export capabilities.  
The JSF and A400M projects reflect a greater maturity of the Turkish defense 
industry and offset implementations, in accordance with the revised offset policies and 
strategic goals. To that end, these two projects can be seen as mechanisms to improve 
capabilities of the national defense industry as well as integrating that industry into the 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
This chapter provides a summary and conclusions regarding Turkish offset policy; 
its current state and recommended directions for future development. To that end, this 
chapter includes an overall summary of the offset literature; offset policies of selected 
countries when appropriate; history and development of Turkish offset policy; and 
analysis of selected Turkish weapon system acquisitions. We conclude with areas for 
further research. 
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Offsets are a form of reciprocal trade and may take place in the arms as well as 
commercial trade. However, offsets are the norm in international arms trade, especially in 
major weapon system acquisitions that feature high cost and technology. Over 130 
countries use offsets and most of them have highly-structured offset policies which 
impose contractual requirements on international procurements. The goods and services 
involved in offset transactions are limited only by the imagination of the parties involved. 
Therefore, the terms and definitions for offsets are not consistent among the various 
authorities, and the subsequent discussion of defense offsets should be placed within the 
wider context of reciprocal sales agreements.  
The three defining conditions for an offset have been defined as purchasing 
government involvement, supplier reciprocity and preferential treatment. First, 
purchasing government involvement is an intervention through laws or public policy, as 
well as seeking scrutiny of offset transactions during the approval processes. Second, 
supplier reciprocity refers to the contractual requirements of the buying country — which 
specify the forms of additional as a prerequisite for contract award. Finally, preferential 
treatment goes to the supplier that meets the offset requirements.  
Two other general concepts for an activity to be counted as an offset are 
additionality/incrementality and causality. Thus, the activity must be in addition to the 
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activity that the offset obligor is already performing in the country and the project must 
have been one that came about because of the offset obligor’s efforts. 
Offsets are closely related to international trade practices. International trade 
concepts are useful starting points for understanding any given offset arrangement. 
However, economic realities and political mechanisms cause international trade practice 
to differ from standard international trade theory. Moreover, since military offsets 
involve national security, they are not subject to WTO rules.  
Each country can be allocated to one of three groups based on giving and 
receiving offset work. First, there is the U.S. that largely exports equipment and thus only 
gives offsets61. Second, there is the small number of states that both import and export 
armaments and thus both give and receive offsets. France, Germany and the UK, for 
example, fall into this category. Finally, there is the large number of states that largely 
import defense equipment and who thus only receive offset work. Developing countries 
form the majority of the last group.   
The incentives for receiving and giving offset work are diverse. The seller country 
uses offsets for channeling work or technology, gaining market share and some form of 
political reasons such as forming and enhancing alliances. Buyer countries are utilizing 
offsets (both military and commercial) that involve transfer of technology and know-how 
for acquiring new technologies and capabilities; establishment of a national defense 
industrial base; increasing self-sufficiency; reducing trade deficits; creating employment 
and production possibilities for domestic labor and industry; creating and increasing 
competitiveness of domestic industry; enhancing alliance cohesion; and responding to 
political concerns. These factors have different effects over time depending on 
environmental developments.  
Offsets are complex and dynamic; therefore offset policies are continuously 
revised based on the economic and political developments — as well as previous 
experience. Declining military budgets, the effects of globalization (such as mergers and 
                                                 
61 However, there are some exceptions for the U.S.. For example, there’s (a) the matter of licensed 
production (e.g., Harrier) and (b) the offset packaged offered by NG-EADS in their KC-45 proposal. 
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acquisitions); and increasing competition for major, high-technology firms accordingly 
increased the bargaining positions of the developing nations. The result increased use of 
offsets. Additionally, the ongoing RMAs brought new defense firms into the global 
market. Overall, offset policies are continuously being revised both by the developed and 
developing nations. 
1. Turkish Offset Policy Development 
Turkey was mostly reliant upon foreign aid from U.S. and NATO to meet the 
requirements of armed forces, and did not have any major defense industrial companies 
until the 1980s. After the deadlock subsequent to the arms embargo following the Cyprus 
Peace Operation reminded Turkey of the necessity to establish and develop a national 
defense industry. Accordingly, state initiatives were undertaken to realize the 
modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces and to establish a national defense industry. 
New legislation (Defense Industry Law, Law no. 3238), new organizations (SSM) and 
new practices (increased use of offsets). 
Additionally, some important capabilities have been realized through these 
projects and industrial activities. These include technology infrastructure, export 
capability, strengthen3e sub-sectors, restructured industry, and greater expertise. 
SSM, an institution capable of formulating long term policies and principles for 
defense offsets, is the only Turkish institution authorized to administer defense offsets. 
SSM was established by legislative passed in 1985. This law stated domestic suppliers 
should be facilitated to the maximum extent practicable for foreign arms procurements — 
pointing toward offsets. The main goal of SSM was to develop a modern defense industry 
in Turkey and to facilitate the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces. SSM is also 
responsible for publishing official documents to set guidelines both for foreign 
contractors and domestic manufacturers. As a result of experiences gained from offset 
projects and changes within global economy, it was considered necessary to publish 
official documents to identify the bureaucratic processes and evaluation criteria for 
offsets, to set guidelines for domestic and foreign companies, and to create a systematic 
approach for offset applications. 
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Turkish policy on defense related offsets can be analyzed in three periods. 
The first period is from 1984 to 2000. Offsets were implemented as a tool of 
financing. The main purpose for offsets related to acquisition of F-16’s, and the other 
offset agreements managed by SSM, was to provide compensation for lost foreign 
exchange. In addition to being regarded mainly as a tool of financing for foreign arms 
procurements, offsets contributed to development of national defense industry by 
providing technology and knowledge transfers between 1991 and 2000. 
The second period is from 2000 to 2007. Offsets were implemented to develop the 
national defense industrial base. With the experiences gained from the previous period, 
SSM focused on selective offset applications — which contributed to the defense 
industry directly.  SSM also undertook to prioritize the offset categories. The main 
objective was to strengthen the national defense industry base. Accordingly, multipliers 
were assigned to technology transfer offsets. 
The third period is from 2007 to future. Offsets are implemented to increase the 
competitive power of Turkish defense industry, and to reach the strategic goals of SSM. 
SSM made significant changes to offsets policy, reviewing it in according to the 
objectives of “2007-2011 Strategic Plan”. SSM emphasized the use of offsets as a critical 
tool for implementing its strategic plan for the development level of the national defense 
industry. SSM expanded the definition of offset to include local content and industrial 
participation. 
Presently, SSM encourages cooperation in high technology areas that require a 
well qualified work force.  Emphasis is also on low investment cost in order to have the 
competitive strength to market and sell end products to other countries.  
Future outlook of SSM and its offset policy is stated in “Strategic Plan for 2007-
2011”. Some of SSM’s strategic goals for 2011 related to offsets are: to increase the 
Turkish defense industry’s work share average to 50% in the frame of procurement 




actively in the multinational defenses and security projects that promote the international 
cooperation, and to participate at least in four multinational defense projects and lead at 
least to an international project. 
2. Selected Major Weapon System Acquisition Projects 
F-16 Project: F-16 procurement is Turkey’s first significant major offset 
application. SSM and its offset policies underwent significant development and as a 
result of this procurement. The first F-16 offset applications started with General 
Dynamics in 1984 as a co-production and co-assembly program. It has since expanded 
leading to a number of F-16 offset applications at various levels. After the initial 
procurement, for which General Dynamics agreed to the assembly of 152 aircraft in 
Turkey in exchange for the purchase of 160 aircraft.  This project became the most 
important modernization program the Turkish Armed Forces undertook.    
The Turkish military achieved modernization at a relatively low financial price, 
but the true impact of F-16 procurement in terms of industrial competiveness and 
relations with the United States remains uncounted. For example, the F-16 offset 
agreement created a significant number of job opportunities for the national defense 
industry, plus high level education and training for its personnel. As a result, Turkey has 
gained a quality labor force for its national defense industry, as well as all of the benefits 
enumerated above. 
Turkey also gained very important industrial complexes, TAI and TEI, for its 
defense industry. In this regard, the F-16 offset agreement introduced new technologies 
with export opportunities to Turkish defense industry. TAI produced and sold 46 F-16 
fighters with Peace Vector-IV program for the Egyptian Air Force between 1993 and 
1995 
A400M Project: The A400M program is a direct result of a commonly expressed 
need by European air forces for a new generation military airlifter. The A400M program 




the European aviation industry. Even though offset agreements are not present in the 
A400M project, industrial participation will likely lead to the same results — perhaps 
even better in some respects like additional sales. 
The industrial responsibilities of the partners are presently distributed such that 
each participant is responsible for its own work-share, which is determined in direct 
relationship to the number of aircraft ordered by its national government. Turkey will buy 
10 A400M aircraft. To compensate for the 10 A400M aircraft TAI will undertake a work-
share of 5.56%. 
Being a partner of Airbus Military S.L. (AMSL), TAI will not only own design 
rights, but also become a partner of Design Organization Approval under AMSL since 
AMSL has general design rights, and type certificate. These approvals will make TAI a 
company, that has control over all the processes, including design, test, certification and 
delivery. 
JSF Project: The overall JSF project, by its nature, does not involve offset 
commitments. Rather, “best value” is the basis for supplier evaluation in all phases of the 
project. Thus, based on the standard Federal Acquisition Regulation clause related to 
competition in subcontracting, DOD and the JSF Program Office have left 
implementation of this competitive approach to Lockheed Martin after deciding to award 
work to companies (foreign and domestic) based on competition. However, the buyer 
country incentives have similar characteristics with those gained with an offset 
transaction.  
Turkey joined in the CDP of the JSF program in 1999, SDD phase in 2002 (as a 
level-III partner) and PSFD phase in 2007 by signing the related MOU documents. On 
the operational side, the objective was to meet the requirement for a new-generation 
fighter to replace the existing F-4 and F-16 fleet after 2012. On the industry side, the 
return was determined as minimum of 50% of the $10.7 Billion cost for a projected 
amount of 100 F-35A aircrafts. SSM has used various support mechanisms to help 
Turkish defense companies identify, bid for, and win contracts from the very beginning 
of the project; the currently expected industrial participation amount for the next 25 years 
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is $5.5 Billion. Also, various efforts are in effect to further participation of Turkish 
defense industries,, including sustainment within the AGLS framework. 
3. Conclusions 
The history of offset policy development in Turkey and our analysis of some 
major projects, although limited in scope and depth, provide a basic understanding of the 
current and future state of Turkish offset policy as well as the domestic defense industry.  
National security is achieved primarily through military capability. Thus, 
developing a powerful national defense industry is vital. Turkey was involved in offsets 
most significantly in the 1980s with the F-16 project. The F-16 project was important in 
initiating the establishment of some major defense companies such TAI. It is noteworthy 
that TAI is now a second-tier supplier in the JSF and A400M projects. 
Turkish Offset Policy policies have been periodically revised over the past 30 
years, and they basically reflect the economic and political developments, as well as 
Turkish offset program experience. SSM requested offsets for all defense procurements 
first as a financing tool to compensate for the cost of the system and facilitating the 
establishment of the defense industry; later on as a tool for developing a defense industry; 
and still later to reach national security goals.  
Measuring the effects of offsets on the economy and the capabilities of the 
defense industry is difficult. However, in the Turkish case, it can be inferred that the 
emphasis on offset policies and developments in the defense industry are concurrent. 
Based on longstanding strategic goals and recent projects, the future offset 
policies will be still be oriented towards accelerating the development of Turkish defense 
industry, and integration of that industry to the global arms trade as a key player.  
Specifically, the SSM’s preferred method of procuring major systems will involve 
initiating indigenous projects for the critical areas — as assessed by potential 
enhancements to required industry capabilities. If indigenous projects are not cost 
effective or feasible, SSM will seek joint development and/or multinational collaboration 
projects such as JSF and A400M. The alternative of seeking international participation in 
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Turkish development projects should be evaluated as well. Finally, co/licensed 
production or offsets (in order to gain workshare) will be the demanded when the 
methods are not feasible. From this point of view, offsets in Turkey are considered part of 
a figurative tool box which includes indigenous projects, R&D oriented programs, and 
joint ventures, intended to enable reaching Turkish national security goals — both short 
and long term. It is noteworthy that the incorporation of program management discipline 
is essential for indigenous solutions to be cost-effective and competitive. Thus, it is vital 
to ensure the involvement of industry in the process of Turkish defense requirements 
determination and acquisition planning.  It is also important to enhance collaboration 
with research institutions and universities. 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study reviewed offset literature and policies of the selected countries, with a 
view to analyzing the history and development of Turkish offset policy. We also 
considered selected case studies. Two of the projects, A400M and JSF are in the early 
phases and still ongoing. Analyzing the effects of those projects on the Turkish defense 
industry in accordance with the defense industrial policy initiatives should prove valuable 
in helping to determine the most advantageous Turkish participation in later stages of 
those projects. 
The effects of offset projects, including commercial applications, on the overall 
economy would also prove valuable. The recent efforts of commercial offsets should be 
analyzed in this regard. 
Assessment of the realization of SSM strategic goals for 2001 and the role of 
offsets for reaching those goals would be another interesting area for further study. 
Prospective acquisition reforms in accordance with the integration of the defense 
industry, procurement authorities, and research institutes to the TAF requirement 
determination process in order to facilitate projected indigenous solutions would also be 
another useful area for further research. 
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